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NEITHER OUT FAR NOR IN DEEP: THE 
PROSPECTS FOR UTILITY-SCALE WIND 
POWER IN THE COASTAL ZONE 
RusTY RUSSELL * 
Abstract: Utility-scale winds in shallow offshore areas offer a significant 
source of clean energy to help meet green power commitments, growing 
electricity demand, and the heightened challenges of climate change and 
air pollution. This is particularly true in the Northeastern United States, 
which has few indigenous energy sources and serious transmission 
constraints. But the primary regulatory mechanism for mediating among 
conflicting uses of the coast and coastal ocean-the Coastal Zone 
Management Act of 1972-is highly decentralized and subject to a 
disorganized array of project veto opportunities. State coastal zone 
programs may not sufficiently account for wind generation's broad 
environmental benefits. Thus, regulatory outcomes-fueled by inapt 
analogies to a history of offshore oil and gas exploitation-will disfavor 
this clean energy source. Federal and state authorities should better 
coordinate their coastal management programs to enable responsible 
siting where near-shore wind power potential is most promising . 
. . . while we listen to the bells-
anywhere, but somewhere else! 
-Robert Lowell, Waking Early Sunday Morning! 
There's almost always a better site for anything. 
-Bill McKibben 2 
* © 2003 Robert H. Russell, J.D., Harvard Law School. Mr. Russell teaches environ-
mental law in the graduate program at Tufts University, and has taught energy regulation, 
environmental law and policy, and property law at other universities and law schools in the 
Boston area. He also consults with nonprofit organizations and government agencies on 
environmental matters. 
I ROBERT LOWELL, NEAR TIlE OCEAN 20 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux) (1967). 
2 Bill McKibben, Serious Wind: Why Environmentalists Should Be Carefltl What They Wish 
For, ORION,July-Aug. 2003, at 14,15. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What goes around comes around. Policymaking moments, like 
the winds, visit in cycles. Fora brief momen t in the early 1940s, Ver-
mont held the distinction of hosting the nation's first and only com-
mercial wind generator.3 Three decades later, in the 1970s, New Eng-
land's coast was to be the site of what would have been the first 
offshore wind power development in the country.4 Although those 
plans were abandoned,5 the passing of another three decades finds 
the region-indeed, the entire Northeastern seaboard-awash in 
proposals to site America's first utility-scale wind farms in the open 
ocean. By early 2003, nearly two dozen offshore projects from Massa-
chusetts to Virginia were under discussion. Based on the initial appli-
cations, these projects totaled nearly 13,000 megawatts, or about forty 
percent of the capacity available to the entire six-state region.6 
In little over half a century, grid-linked wind power has pro-
gressed from a workbench fantasy to a renewable resource that, in the 
view of an increasing n umber of observers, is ready to compete head-
to-head with the conventional technologies that continue to generate 
the bulk of the nation's electricity: combustion of coal and natural 
3 The distinction was fleeting. In 1945, the wind turbine atop Grandpa's Knob, a 1976-
foot hillock northwest of Rutland, Vt., threw its eight-ton blade 750 feet, then lapsed into 
disrepair. Its foundations remain today. See Kim R. York & Richard L. Settle, Potential Legal 
Facilitation or Impediment of Wind Energy Conversion System Siting, 58 WASIl. L. REV. 387, 400 
(1983); Telephone Interview with Gordon Cawood, Electrical Engineer and Trip Leader 
for the Green Mountain Club, Breadloaf Section (Dec. 8, 2003); Telephone Interview with 
Larry Dodds, Power Systems Operator, Central Vermont Public Service (Dec. 8, 2003). 
4 J.F. Manwell et aI., An Offshore Wind Resource /lssessmtmt Study for New England, 27 RE-
NEWABLE ENERGY 175, 175 (2002). 
5 Id.; E-mail from James F. Manwell, Director, Renewable Energy Research Laboratory, 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, to Rusty Russell (Dec. 8, 2003, 10: 15:04 EST) (on file 
with author). 
6 Total installed capacity of the New England grid is more than 31,000 megawatts. ISO 
NEW ENGLAND, at http://www.iso-ne.com/(last visited Jan. 12, 2004). For several offshore 
wind power proposals, see WINERGY, at http://www.winergyllc.com/(last visited Jan. 12, 
2004). By July 12, 2003, Winergy had proposed twenty wind projects totaling more than 
12,000 megawatts in federal and state waters off of six states from Massachusetts to Vir-
ginia-although the company subsequently withdrew some of its proposals. Id. Addition-
ally, Cape Wind Associates has proposed a controversial 130-turbine, 420-megawatt wind 
project on Horseshoe Shoal, a shallow area located in federal waters between Cape Cod, 
on the Massachusetts mainland, and the islands of Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket. CAPE 
WIND Assocs., at http://www.capewind.org (last visited Jan. 12, 2004). For a definition of 
capacity, see infm note 20. 
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gas, and nuclear fission. 7 Yet in the United States today, the power of 
wind remains largely untapped.s 
Many signs, however, poin t to a considerably larger role for wind in 
the near future. These include: (1) new federal9 and particularly state lO 
commitments to the development of renewable resources; (2) the in-
tensifYing effort to iden tilY broad-scale strategies that can effectively 
address climate change;11 (3) public recognition of environmentaJ12 
7 In 2002, for example, coal-fired power plants supplied 59.5% of the megawatt-hours of 
electricity that utilities sold to U.S. consumers; nuclear units provided 19.9%; and natural gas 
fired generators provided 9%. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTIUC POWER MONTIlLY 9 
tbl.1.2 (Apr. 2003), http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/electricity/epm/02260304.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 12,2004). 
8 As of October 27, 2003, total U.S. wind capacity was 5325.7 megawatts, a tiny fraction 
of the nation's electric generation capacity. See AM. WIND ENERGY AsS'N, WIND ENERGY 
PROJECTS THROUGHOUT TIlE UNTrED STATES OF AMERICA, at http://www.awea.org/pro-
jects/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2004) [hereinafter WIND ENERGY PROJECTS]; see also infra note 
20. As of 2002, total U.S. capacity was approximately 903,000 megawatts. See U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2002, at 243 tbl.8.7a (2002), available at http:/ / 
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/03842002.pdf (last vi~ited Jan. 12, 2004). 
9 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY & U.S. DEP'T OF TIH INTERIOR, WHITE HOUSE RE-
PORT IN RESPONSE TO TIlE NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO INCREASE 
RENEWABLE ENERGY PRODUCTION ON FEDERAL LANDS (Aug. 2002), available at 
http://www. doLgov/news/pdf/FinaIWhiteHouseReportwithAppendicies.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 12,2004) [hereinafter NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
10 A number of states add a small surcharge to consumer electric bills to fund efforts to 
stimulate renewable resource development or require electricity retailers to obtain a 
specified percen tage of their power from clean resources by a certain date. Massachusetts, for 
instance, has both a fund and a portfolio standard (4% of all megawatt-hours sold in state by 
2009). Other states with one or both include: Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, 
New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., STATUS 
OF STATE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITY, PUBLIC BENEFITS PROGRAMS AS OF 
FEBRUARY 2003, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str/pbp.htrnl (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2004); UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, STATE CLEAN ENERGY MAPS AND GRAPHS, 
at http://www.ucsusa.org/ clean_energy /renewable_energy / page.cfm?pageID = 895 (last 
visited Jan. 12,2004). 
11 See generally Mark Z. Jacobson & G.M. Masters, Exploiting Wind Ver.sus Coal, 293 SCI. 
1438 (2001); SOREN KROHN, DANISH WIND INDUSTRY AsS'N, OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY: 
FULL SPEED AHEAD, at http://www.windpower.org/en/articles/offshore.htm (Oct. 2002). 
12 The environmental benefits of wind generation are significant. With the minor excep-
tion of the manufacturing and scrapping processes, wind is essentially non-polluting. Cristina 
Archer & Mark Z. Jacobson, Spatial and Temporal Distributions of u.s. Winds and Wind Power at 
80 m Derived from Measurements, 108 J. GEOPHYSICAL REs., No. D9, May 2003, at 1. For a con-
cise summary of all of its benefits, see AWS SCIENTIFIC, INC., LONG ISLAND'S OFFSHORE WIND 
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL: A PRELIMINARY AsSESSMENT 3 (Apr. 2002) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter LONG ISLAND'S WIND POTENTIAL]. The environmental downsides are 
few; indeed, some seem rather speculative or ephemeral. The main ones are the potential 
threat to birds in certain locations and the question of aesthetics. Chri~tine Real de Azua, The 
Future of Wind Energy, 14 TuL. ENVTL. LJ. 485, 495 n.59 (2001). With regard to the latter, 
compare Margot Roosevelt, Not in My Back Bay, TIME, Sept. 30, 2002, at 62 (turbines are "big 
and bizarre-looking"), with David Armstrong, Blow Hard Wind-generated Power Is Back. Will It 
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consequences of an electricity industry based primarily on coal and nu-
clear power; (4) awareness ofthe lack ofresource diversity and the risks 
it creates; and (5) mounting anxiety that this highly-centralized system 
of production poses both economic13 and securityl4 threats. 
Parts of the nation, particularly the Great Plains area, offer wind 
resources of such magnitude that they could theoretically satisfy 
America's entire demand for power.15 But electricity is ephemeral. 
Large supplies cannot be stored, and physics and economics place 
limits on how far it can be transmitted. This makes the developmen t 
of renewable resources in proximity to large population centers an 
option worth investigating. 
The goal of this Article is twofold. First, it endeavors to show that 
large-scale, offshore wind generation represents a significant resource 
likely to be of growing in terest to energy developers and policymakers 
over the next decade. Next, it considers the extent to which the 
Coastal Zone Management Act of 197216-the primary legal frame-
work for assessing development and conservation along America's 
96,300-mile coastlinel7-is suited to the task of addressing both the 
challenge and opportunity presented by offshore, utility-scale wind 
generation. This Article concludes that the growing interest in off-
shore wind is not likely to receive a sympathetic hearing under the 
Act, its regulations, or the highly-differentiated, locally-focused pro-
grams states have designed in its wake. In fact, if corrective action is 
not taken soon, the existing legal framework could deal renewables a 
major setback. 
Make Money This Time Around?, FORBES, Jan. 2001, at 217 (turbines' "apparent visual loveli-
ness"), and Wendy Williams, Princeton Repowering; A Proud Town of Revolutionaries, Windpower 
Monthly, Feb. 2003, at 29 ("majestic towers ... [are] so gorgeous"). 
13 The power blackout that began on the afternoon of August 14, 2003-which took 
down approximately 61,800 megawatts of capacity that served 50 million people-is a re-
cent example. Mike Mcintire, The Blackout: Measure1nents; How Many in the Dark? Evidently 
Not 50 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2003, § 1, at 29. 
14 See, e.g., James McKinley, Political Memo; Lawmakers Step Lightly Along a Nuclear Tight-
rope, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2003, at Bl. 
15 D.L. ELLIOT ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, REPORT PNL-7789/UC-261, AN AsSESS-
MENT OF TIlE AVAILABLE WINDY LAND AREA AND WIND ENERGY POTEN'rIAL IN TIlE CON-
TIGUOUS UNITED STATES (1991) (on file with author) (concluding that the available po-
tential in the nation's three most wind-rich states-North Dakota, Kansas and Texas-
could meet the entire then-current U.S. electricity demand). 
16 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465 (2003). 
17 JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 192 (2d 
ed. 2002). This is the length of coast regulated under state and federal coastal zone man-
age men t programs. It includes the U.S. shore of the Great Lakes as well as the coastlines of 
five U.S. territories. 
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I. OFFSHORE WIND POWER: A RESOURCE WAITING To HAPPEN 
A. A Maturing Energy Option 
Wind power has grown at a rate of over thirty percent a year for at 
least a decade. IS It is now the most rapidly expanding commercial-scale 
energy resource in the world.t9 In 1999, more megawatts (MW)20 of 
wind power capacity were installed than nuclear capacity.21 Globally, 
total terrestrial and offshore wind capacity grew from 4800 MW in 1995 
to more than 37,200 MW at the beginning of 2004.22 By the turn of the 
century, wind power had become a $2.5 to $3 billion industry.23 Of all 
renewable energy sources under development in the United States, 
wind is the one most likely at present to be in a position to compete 
economically with fossil fuels. It is more cost efficien t than conven tional 
generation, at least in some areas and applications.24 Furthermore, in-
dustry optimism has grown over recent years. As one proponent re-
cen tty put it, wind has finally "achieved a sort of critical mass. "25 
Nonetheless, wind power's actual contribution thus far has been 
modest, particularly in the U.S. Here, in 2002, it supplied less than 
18 NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 9, at 6. 
19 Id.; Real de Azua, supra note 12, at 486. 
20 A generator's capacity is usually measured in megawatts, abbreviated hereinafter as 
MW. The concept refers to the ability to supply a given level of electric power at a given 
moment. Conversely, the actual volume of power, the "energy," is a product of the capacity 
multiplied by the duration that this capacity is available. Thus, a 100 MW power plant op-
erating at full capacity for an hour will generate 100 megawatt-hours (MWb) of energy. 
One MW of electricity from a conventional power plant generally is sufficient to meet the 
needs of 750-1000 average residences. Wind generators typically operate 15% to 55% less 
than conventional plants. See Real de Azua supm note 12, at 497 n.61; see also Peter J. Howe, 
Record Power Use Looms, BOSTON GLOBE,July 30,2002, at D1. 
21 Real de Azua, supra note 12, at 486. 
22 LESTER R. BROWN, EARW POLICY INST., WIND POWER SET TO BECOME WORLD'S 
LEADING ENERGY SOURCE at http://www.earth-policy.org/Updates/Update24_printable. 
htrn (june 25, 2003). By January 2004, 73% of this capacity was sited in Europe, 17% in 
the U.S. and 10% elsewhere (approximately two-thirds of that in Asia). See operating Wind 
Power Capacity, Windpower Monthly, Jan. 2004, at 66, 66. 
23 Taylor Moore, Wind Power: Gaining Momentum, EPRI J., Winter 1999, at 8, 10. 
24 Compare id. at 17 (wind power close to market competitiveness), with Real de Azua, 
supra note 12, at 490-93 (wind now competitive with conventional power plants). See 
Jacobson & Masters, supra note 11. These conclusions are exclusive of two energy sources 
sometimes claimed to be renewable-hydropower and solid waste combustion. Large, and 
sometimes small, hydro facilities as well as refuse-to-energy plants pose a significant risk to 
habitat and to human health. Jacobson & Masters, supm note 11 (accounting for environ-
mental benefits can make wind cost effective). 
25 Moore, supra note 23, at 10; see also BROWN, supra note 22 ("[T]he energy future be-
longs to wind."). 
226 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 31:221 
0.3% of the nation's electricity.26 Indeed, all non-hydropower renew-
abIes together accounted for a mere 2.18% of total net electricity gen-
eration.27 
Several states have emerged as leaders in wind energy as a result 
of focused state policy initiatives, funding, or tax incentives.28 Still, 
total installed capacity in early 2004 was only 6336 MW. All but four 
percent is west of the Appalachians, and virtually none is on the East 
Coast or in New England.29 
B. The Attmction of Offshore Wind Energy 
The coastal zone represents an important and potentially sizable 
untapped source of wind power.30 This is particularly so along the east-
ern seaboard.31 The reasons are several. 
26 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NET GENERATION: TOTAL (ALL SECTORS), 1949-2002, 
at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/txt/ptb0802a.html(preliminary figures) (last vis-
ited Jan. 14, 2004); In 2002, wind accounted for 12.5% of non-hydro renewable energy 
generation, with most of the remainder derived from other "traditional" renewables like 
biomass, solar, and geothermal power. [d. 
27 [d. 
28 See, e.g., Real de Azua, supra note 12, at 493-94, 497-518. California led the way with 
installed capacity of 1987.9 MW, approximately 37% of the U.S. total. Other leaders include 
Texas (-1096 MW), Iowa (-423 MW), Minnesota (-401 MW), Washington (-228 MW), Ore-
gon (-218 MW), Wyoming (-141 MW) and Kansas (-114 MW). See WIND ENERGY PROJECTS, 
supm note 8. Of these, California, Washington, and Oregon-accounting for nearly half the 
national wind capacity-are not even among the 15 jurisdictions with the greatest wind re-
source potential. See AM. WIND ENERGY AsS'N, WIND ENERGY: AN UNTAPPED RESOURCE, 
http://www.awea.org/pubs/factsheets/WindEnergyAnUntappedResource.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 12,2004). 
29 See Operating Wind Power Capacity, Wind power Monthly, Jan. 2004, at 66, 66. A single 
660 kW turbine on the shore in Hull, Massachusetts, a town of 11,000 located on a penin-
sula just southeast of Boston, is perhaps the most prominent example of coastal wind 
power generation in the Northeast. For a description of the Hull turbine, and other Mas-
sachusetts municipalities that are attempting to follow Hull's lead, see, for example, Peter 
DeMarco, Tide Turns for Wind Turbines, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 9, 2003, at Globe North 1 and 
Scott Kirsner, Wind Power's New Current, N.V. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at Gl. 
30 Indeed, offshore wind's potential has gone largely unnoticed in the policy literature. 
An extensive 2002 analysis of the future of renewable energy in the United States, for ex-
ample, does not mention it at all. See Richard L. Ottinger & Rebecca Williams, 2002 Energy 
Law Symposium: Renewable Energy Sources for Development, 32 ENVTL. L. 331 (2002); cj. Archer 
& Jacobson, supra note 12, at 19 (concluding "[tlhe greatest previously uncharted reser-
voir of wind power in the continental United States is offshore and onshore along the 
southeastern and southern coasts."); Jack Jackson, Americans Seek Offshore Answers, Wind-
power Monthly, Jun. 2003, at 66, 66 (offshore "a very juicy area of opportunity" (quoting 
Dr. Robert W. Thresher, director of U.S. National Wind Technology Center)). 
31 Recent national wind studies suggest that the offshore resource is more favorable in 
the Northeast than originally believed. Archer & Jacobson, supm note 12, at I, 19 (wind 
power potential in the United States may be "substantially greater than previously esti-
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First, although the data are preliminary, a number of offshore lo-
cations appear to offer outstanding, perhaps even optimal, conditions 
for utility-scale wind generation.32 These sites are close to the shore, 
reducing the capital costs of connection to the land-based transmission 
grid.33 Depths do not exceed fifty feet,34 which right now is considered 
at or near the limit of technical feasibility.35 The sites are near high-
voltage transmission lines on land36 and thus offer lower connection 
mated"); sec, e.g., MASS. 'ThCH. COLLABORATIVE, WIND ENERGY RESOURCE AND COASTAL 
BATHYMETRY MAP OF MASSACHUSETrS, at http://www.mtpc.org/RenewableEnergy/ 
green_power/Map7_Massachusetts.pdf (last visited Jan. 12,2004); PAC. N.W. NAT'L LAB., 
WIND ENERGY RESOURCE ATLAS OF TIlE UNITED STi\TES, http://rredc.nrel.gov/wind/ 
pubs/atlas/maps/chap3/3-21m.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2004); see also Manwell et al. 
supra note 4, at 185 (stating that offshore wind speed projections in New England "are 
encouraging"). Further, a recent analysis of wind potential off the southern shore of Long 
Island in New York identified a 135-square mile area less than three miles from shore with 
waters shallower than fifty feet that would offer sufficiently strong winds to provide 2250 
MWof capacity-enough to meet almost a third of the electricity needs of Long Island's 
nearly three million people. LONG ISLAND'S WIND POTENTIAL, supra note 12, at Exec. Sum. 
i, 12. Initial examination of the wind potential in the Mid-Atlantic region and Carolinas 
also appears encouraging. One recent Virginia study, for example, found that 83% of the 
state's utility-scale wind resources lie within a 400-square mile area located within Virginia 
state waters and in Chesapeake Bay. See George Hagerman, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 
Presentation at 1st Virginia Wind Energy Workshop (Mar. 21, 2003) (on file with author). 
Utility-scale winds and relatively shallow waters off the North Carolina coast also suggest 
"tremendous potential." Telephone Interview with Bob Leker, Renewable Program Man-
ager, North Carolina Energy Office (Aug. 26, 2003). 
32 See, e.g., BRUCE BAILEY, AWS SCIENTIFIC, INC., OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY DEVELOP-
MENT IN TIlE US, http://www.nationalwind.org/events/offshore/020925/presentations/ 
bailey. pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2004). This presentation includes a map on a page titled 
"Offshore Development Potential" showing offshore wind speeds measured at 230-foot 
elevations along the Eastern seaboard at water depths of fifty feet or less. Average speeds of 
seventeen miles per hour have been identified over significant portions of this area. These 
are generally considered to be very promising for utility-scale development. See NATIONAL 
ENERGY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 9, at 6. Nonetheless, one should not as-
sume that wind energy can be harnessed in everyone of these locations. Resource variabil-
ity, lack of transmission access, conflicting uses, danger to wildlife, and the regulatory is-
sues discussed in Part Ill, infra, could inhibit or preclude development in specific areas. 
33 Offshore cable connections can cost $1 to $2 million per mile. SALLY D. WRIGHT, AN-
TIl0NY L. ROGERS, JAMES F. MANWELL & ANTIIONY ELLIS, RENEWABLE ENERGY RESEARCH 
LAB, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETrS, TRANSMISSION ,OPTIONS FOR OFFSHORE WIND FARMS 
IN TIlE UNITED STATES 9 (2002). In contrast, landside cable connections may cost only 
$100,000 per mile. Armstrong, supra note 12, at 217. 
M See BAILEY, supra note 32. 
35 See Drew Robb, Offshore Wind Struggles to Gain Foothold in North America, POWER ENGI-
NEERING, Aug. 2002, at 44, 48 (stating that deep-water technology is "still in its infancy"); 
LONG ISLAND'S WIND POTENTIAL, supra note 12, at II, 27 (stating that wind farms in water 
50-100 feet deep "would not be economically viable in the foreseeable future."). 
36 An offshore cable linked to the landside grid generally must have a capacity of 115 
kilovolts (kV) or more. LONG ISLAND'S WIND POTENTIAL, supra note 12, at 6. 
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costs. Moreover, they do not present obvious conflicts with migratory 
birds, mobile-gear fisheries, ocean-based shipping, or marine recrea-
tion. 
In addition, many coastal areas, particularly in the Northeast, have 
large population centers37 with sizable demand for electricity. Any at-
tempt to meet this demand exclusively by siting large wind power facili-
ties on land would face substantial and possibly insurmountable barri-
ers. These include intense public opposition, lack of available sites, 
incompatible zoning and land-use regulation, and potentially severe 
conflicts with other uses-among them, aviation, recreation, and con-
servation. These drawbacks are amplified by the generally modest na-
ture of the wind resource available within populous shoreline coun-
ties.38 In contrast, an offshore wind farm sited near concentrated 
demand can still side-step some or all of these barriers, and should 
therefore stand a better chance of approval. 
The most attractive feature of offshore generation is that the re-
source itself is generally better. First of all, wind speeds are consis-
tently higher than on land-perhaps by twenty-five percent or more.39 
Since the energy content of wind increases by the cube of wind speed, 
twenty-five percent higher velocity nearly doubles the energy poten-
tial. 40 In addition, when winds are free of terrestrial irnpedirnen ts-
office buildings, houses, and the crenellated landscape-they benefit 
37 By 1990, about 53% of the U.S. population lived in coastal counties. NAT'L SCI. & 
TECH. COUNCIL, COMM. ON ENV'T AND NATURAL RES., SETTING A NEW COURSE FOR U.S. 
COASTAL OCEAN SCIENCE-FINAL REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITrEE ON U.S. COASTAL OCEAN 
SCIENCE (july 1995), http://www.cop.noaa.gov/pubs/suscos/l-intro.html (last visited Jan. 
12, 2004) [hereinafter SETTING A NEW COURSE]. Coastal density in New England is even 
more extreme, given the region's small size and large population. For instance, approxi-
mately two-thirds of Maine's residents live in coastal communities. Barbara A. Vestal, Duel-
ing with Boat Oars, Dragging Through Mooring Lines: Time for More FOT11tal Resolution of Use 
Conflicts in States' Coastal Watersr 4 OCEAN & COASTAL LJ. 1,22 (1999). 
38 See supra note 31; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RENEWABLE POTENTIAL MAPS: NEW 
ENGLAND DrvISION, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/reps/rpmap/rp_new-eng.html(last 
visited Jan. 12, 2004). 
39 See LONG ISLAND'S WIND POTENTIAL, supra note 12, at 4; KROHN, supra note 11. A 
key element is that offshore wind speeds are not simply higher on average, but that their 
inevitable variations are more tightly clustered around the mean. This increases reliability 
as well as power available for use. See KROHN, supra note 11. 
40 LONG ISLAND'S WIND POTENTIAL, supra note 12, at 4; KROHN, supra note 11 (stating 
that energy yield can be up to 73% higher offshore, but that "economically optimised" off-
shore turbines will generally produce 50% more energy than those at nearby land locations). 
2004] The Prospects for Utility-Scale Wind Power in the Coastal Zone 229 
from shorter and less frequent fluctuations of the type that can dam-
age a turbine or force a shut-down.41 
Although offshore wind turbines cost more than those built at 
prime sites on land,42 a good many of the latter are in the vicinity of 
North Dakota or other sparsely populated areas. Hence, offshore 
wind remains a particularly attractive and significant option in energy 
poor regions like the Northeast. This is amplified by the difficulty of 
siting land-based turbines, which arises from a combination of trans-
mission constraints,43 the rarity of good sites near large population 
centers, and the relatively high cost of other energy resources, espe-
cially in New England.44 
C. The International Experience 
By the numbers, offshore wind power is more advanced in other 
nations than in the United States. By the end of 2002, large projects 
were operating in Denmark, with others on line in the U.K., Sweden 
and the Netherlands.45 Major initiatives were planned elsewhere.46 
41 LONG ISLAND'S WIND POTENTIAL, supra note 12, at 4; S.C. Pryor & RJ. Barthelmie, 
Comparison of Potential Power Production at On- and Offshore Sites, 4 WIND ENERGY 173, 173, 
180 (2001); Robb, supra note 35, at 44; KROHN, supra note 11. 
42 LONG ISLAND'S WIND POTENTIAL, supra note 12, at 6 (estimating that total installed 
cost of an offshore wind farm may be 50% greater than the land-based equivalen t). Never-
theless, the average cost of wind power in the U.S. has dropped from $0.35-O.38/kWh in 
the early 1980s to $0.03-O.06/kWh today. See Archer & Jacobson, supra note 12, at 1; Real 
de Azua supra note 12, at 490; BROWN, supra note 22. 
43 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, PUBLIC INFORMATION MEETING 13 (Oct. 29, 2003) (re-
jecting review of alternate sites in northern New England for Cape Wind project due in 
part to transmission constraints), http://www.nae.usace.army.mil (last visited Jan. 12, 
2004); John Leaning, Report Questions Power Line Limits, CAPE COD TIMES, Nov. 8, 2003 
(stating that ·one major factor in rejecting sites in northern New England was the inability 
of existing transmission systems to absorb the additional energy that would be produced by 
a wind farm"), http://www.capecodonline.com/special/windfarm/reportquestions8.htm 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2004). 
44 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., REG'L ENERGY PROFILE, NEW ENGLAND DATA ABSTRACT 
(supporting the proposition that New England has few if any fossil fuel resources), at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/reps/abstracts/new_eng.html(last visited Jan. 12, 2004). 
45 Gail Rajgor, Slightly Cautious on Growth Prediction, Windpower Monthly, May 2003, at 
59, 59-60 (indicating that installed offshore wind power almost tripled worldwide in 
2002). 
46 Ireland's appears to be the largest: a 200-turbine, 520-MW wind farm 3.5 miles off-
shore on a sand bank in the Irish Sea south of Dublin. Janice Massy, UK and Ireland Poised to 
Build; Full Steam Ahead in Friendly Waters, Windpower Monthly, Mar. 2003, at 68, 69. The 
project would supply 10% of the nation's electricity. Robb, supra note 36, at 44; see also 
L.W.M BEURSKENS & M. DE NOORD, OFFSHORE WIND POWER DEVELOPMENTS, AN OVER-
VIEW OF REALISATIONS AND PLANNED PROJECTS 5, 7 (2003), http://www.ecn.nl/docs/lib-
rary/report/2003/c03058.pdf (last visited Jan. 12,2004). 
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Denmark, in fact, is a benchmark of wind-power success. In 2001, 
wind generation met nearly twenty percent of the nation's total electric-
ity consumption; by the end of 2003, offshore wind generation alone 
supplied nearly four percent of total Danish electricity demand. At that 
time, five offshore projects were in operation, with a sixth under con-
struction. The largest on line now, Horns Rev, consists of eighty 2-MW 
turbines placed six to seventeen miles from shore in depths of ap-
proximately nineteen to forty-six feetY Other project sites range from a 
little more than one to twelve miles off the coast,48 generally in water of 
this depth or less. The current Danish energy plan contemplates that 
wind power will supply half of the nation's electricity by 2030.49 Given 
the limited number of suitable sites on land, much of this new capacity 
is expected to be developed in the relatively shallow seas that surround 
the country.50 
In addition to Denmark, other nations have ambitious plans. 
Germany, which has the largest installed wind capacity in the world,51 is 
considering the development of 12,000 MW offshore.52 The UK is mov-
ing forward with similar plans for at least 9000 MW, and possibly 
more.53 
Unlike Europe, however, the U.S. has few large areas that are rela-
tively far from shore and that offer shallow water and strong winds.54 As 
47 Edward F. Maroney, Gordon: Danes Feel Great About Offshore Wind Parks, BARNSTABLE 
PATRIOT (Barnstable, Mass.), June 27, 2003, available at hup:/ /www.barnstablepatriot. 
com/06-27-03-news/gordon.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2004); see KROHN, supra note 11. 
Other Danish wind farms now in operation are: Vindeby (4.5 MW) and Tunoe Knob (5 
MW), both pilot projects; Middelgrunden (40 MW); and Samsoe (23 MW). Nysted (158 
MW) was to be operational by the end of autumn, 2003. KROHN, supra note 11. At 160 MW, 
Horns Rev is reported to be the largest offshore wind farm in the world. Maroney, supra. 
Jack Jackson, All Eyes on Scandinavian Progress; Denmark Centre of Offshore Attention, Wind-
power Monthly, Mar. 2003, at 68, 68; Presentation by Carsten H. Nielsen, Engineer, Eisam 
(Danish Independent Power Producer) in Esbjerg, Denmark (Jan. 16, 2004) (notes on file 
with author). 
48 See KROHN, supra note 11. 
49Id. 
50 See Svend Auken, Issues and Policy: Answers in the Wind: How Denmark Became a World 
Pioneer in Wind Power, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AJ'F. 149, 149, 156 (2002). 
51 Germany accounts for approximately one-third of all wind power capacity in the 
world. DW-World.de, Storm Brewing over the Question of Wind Energy (Aug. 27, 2003), at 
http://www.dw-world.de/english/O.3367.1446_A_957029_1_A.OO.html(last visited Jan. 12, 
2004). 
52 BROWN, supra note 22. 
53 Janice Massy, Fast Track Permitting of Offshore Wind, Wind power Monthly, Apr. 2003, at 
25, 25; Janice Massy, Wind in a New League off British Coast, Wind power Monthly, Jan. 2004, 
at 28, 28. 
54 Robb, supra note 35, at 48. 
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a result, renewable energy policy in this country is faced with a di-
lemma: either wait un til cost-effective deep-water construction technol-
ogy has been developed and fully tested, a process that could take years, 
or make an effort right now to site turbines in areas that are relatively 
close to land-most of them in waters over which the states have pri-
mary jurisdiction. 
D. Near-Shore Wind Generation: The Coastal Issues 
Size is the chief siting issue that near-shore development raises. 
Economics of offshore wind favor large turbines as well as large ar-
rays.55 
At sea, the optimal project will tend to be larger than it is on 
land. First, fixed costs-particularly those of the undersea cable, steel 
foundations and installation apparatus, and maintenance-are con-
siderably higher. All else being equal, it makes sense to spread those 
costs among many generators. Second, economies of scale in the 
manufacture of both the turbines and the foundations favor larger 
wind farms. Third, it is easier to capture the higher offshore winds 
using the largest turbines commercially available.56 
Considering the higher cost of offshore construction, the optimal 
size of an ocean-based project is likely to be 100 MWor greater.57 Rely-
ing on technology available today, a project like this will consist of 
forty to fifty turbines-each of which may be more than 420 feet from 
base to blade tip.58 Attractive to some, imposing to others, an array of 
this magnitude inevitably will be understood as a threat to other uses 
and interests in the coastal area and on the water. If opposition 
reaches critical mass, the perception of threat will evolve into organ-
ized opposition, becoming a political and legal reality. 
55 See KROHN, supra note 11. 
56 See Robb, supra note 35, at 46; KROHN, supra note 11. Today, the largest turbines 
have a capacity of 2 to 2.5 MW, and a rotor diameter 25% wider than the wingspan of a 
Boeing 747. See id. Some manufacturers are testing turbines of more than 5 MW. Robb, 
supra note 35, at 46. 
57 See LONG ISLAND'S WIND POTENTIAL, supra note 12, at 6. 
58 See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 288 F. Supp. 
64,68 (D. Mass. 2003) (stating that wind generators proposed for Horseshoe Shoal would 
ascend 423 feet from base to blade tip). 
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II. COASTAL MANAGEMENT: A REGULATORY COLLAGE 
Expansive near-shore wind development is likely to attract con-
troversy and opposition.59 But whether the outcry is loud or muted, 
the controversy will be examined through the lens of the nation's 
coastal zone managemen t program. The coastal zone program is the 
primary means by which federal, state, and local agencies and politi-
cal units attempt to balance and harmonize intensive and contradic-
tory patterns of use along the expansive American shore. To fully ap-
preciate the challenges wind power faces, it is necessary to consider 
the values, policy objectives, and legal framework of this unusual pro-
gram.60 
A. The Fault Line of Coastal Policy 
Over the centuries, the American coastline has become a conflict 
waiting to happen. From colonial times, public trust concepts have 
accorded to private citizens the right to engage in a variety of com-
mercial activities along the coast and in coastal waters.61 During that 
early period, the states generally took the lead in regulating offshore 
fishing.62 Not long after, the federal government developed an inter-
est in maintaining shoreline integrity.63 American federalism, aug-
mented by a long tradition of local land use control, continues to en-
sure that coastal oversight is a relatively decentralized, and therefore 
complex, task. 
In the twentieth century, particularly in recent decades, the poten-
tial for conflict has been realized. The 1990 U.S. population living in 
coastal counties stood at more than 133 million. That population is in-
creasing nearly fifteen percent faster than in inland areas.64 By 2025, 
59 See, e.g., ALLIANCE TI> PROTECT NANnJCKET SOUND, INC., at http://www.saveour 
sound.org/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2004) (providing an example of a vocal organization op-
posed to the Cape Wind proposal in Massachusetts). 
60 See TIMOTIlY BEATLEY ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TI> COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT 
102 (2d ed. 2002). 
61 See Vestal, supra note 37, at 24-28. 
62 Erin R. Englebrecht, Comment, Can Aquaculture Continue to Circumvent the Regulatory 
Net of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act?, 51 EMORY LJ 1187, 
1234 (2002). 
63 See Ronald J. Rychlak, Coastal Zone Management and the Search for Integration, 40 
DEPAUL L. REV. 981, 984 (1991) (noting federal involvement in erosion control at Fort 
Moultri, S.C., in 1829). 
64 SETTING A NEW COURSE, supra note 37, at introduction; see also Robin Kundis Craig, 
Taking the Long View of Ocean Ecosystems: Historical Science, Marine Restoration, and the Oceans 
Act of 2000, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 649, 652 n.l0 (2002) (excluding Alaska, average coastal 
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nearly three-quarters of the nation is expected to live along the 
coast65-even though its 672 coastal counties account for only fourteen 
percent ofthe total land area of the contiguous states.66 
New understanding of the enormous biological productivity of 
the coastal ocean-the area stretching 200 nautical miles from the 
shoreline to the far edge of the Exclusive Economic Zone67-has 
served to intensify the conflict. Today, the coastal ocean is a vital and 
unique ecological resource. It also is the source of fossil fuel and min-
eral wealth, and significant recreational opportunities.68 Offshore 
wind power is one of the most recent arrivals in a complicated, con-
gested, and contentious arena. At the most general level, the chal-
lenges that confront wind development arise from the two faces of 
federalism: (1) state exercise of power to defend territorial waters 
from locally undesirable coastal uses;69 and (2) a persistent federal 
aversion to addressing or even identifying the most pressing of the 
myriad demands for coordination that test coastal management.70 
B. The CZMll: A.Harbinger oj Devolution 
The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)71 establishes the 
structure whereby competing demands and conflicts along the coast 
and in state waters are mediated among federal, state, and local agen-
population density increased from 187 people per square mile in 1960 to 273 per square 
mile in 1994. By 2015, the number is expected to grow 20% to 327 people per square 
mile). 
65 See BEAnEY ET AL., supra note 60, at 283. 
66 See SETI'ING A NEW COURSE, supra note 37, at http://www.cop.noaa.gov/lmages/ 
suscos%20gifs/fig2.gif (last visited Jan. 12, 2004). 
67 Several jurisdictional bands exist (and to an extent overlap) within the 200-nautical 
mile limit. State waters generally extend three statute miles from the shoreline (except in 
Texas and Florida, where the boundary is about ten miles from shore). Federal waters 
stretch from the seaward edge of state waters to the outer boundary of the Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone (EEZ). The U.S. territorial sea extends twelve nautical miles offshore. The 
EEZ consists of the entire area between the outer edge of the U.S. territorial sea and the 
200-nautical mile limit. SeeBILIANA CICIN-SAIN & ROBERTW. KNECHT, THE FUTURE OF U.S. 
OCEAN POLICY: CHOICES FOR THE NEW CENTURY 21 fig.1.2 (2000). 
68 SETTING A NEW COURSE, supra note 37, at introduction. 
69 On land, these are known as LULUs (locally undesirable land uses). Here, perhaps, 
they should be called LUCAs (locally undesirable coastal activities). 
70 See Craig, supra note 64, at 658-71. 
71 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465 (2000). The CZMA was overwhelmingly approved by Con-
gress and subsequently signed into law by President Richard M. Nixon on October 27, 
1972. 
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cies.72 When it was enacted more than thirty years ago, the CZMA pres-
aged a shift in regulatory authority from the federal government to the 
states-a trend that has accelerated over the past two decades. 73 The 
Act and state programs it promotes mark a period of intensifYing and 
sometimes incompatible public and private in terest in coastal re-
sources, both on land and in water. Unlike other legislation affecting 
the coast and ocean,74 the CZMA is designed to be general and integra-
tive in its application. Unlike many other major environmental laws, it 
openly embraces a devolutionary federalism. 75 It encourages states to 
take charge of their own coastal problems, often with little federal over-
sight and even less interference. 
The CZMA, in fact, remains one of the few major examples of a 
federal statute that envisions a fully cooperative relationship among the 
levels of government. It is said to be both the federal government's 
"first major experiment with an integrated environmental program, "76 
and "the oldest national-level coastal management program in the 
72 See BEATLEY ET AL., supra note 60, at 102 (CZMA is the "cornerstone of federal ef-
forts to protect and manage our nation's coastlines"). 
73 Markus G. Puder & John A. Veil, Issue in Environmental Law: The Discrete Charm of Co-
operative Federalism: Environmental Citizen Suits in the Balance, 27 VT. L. REV. 81, 97 (2002) 
(statutes promoting cooperative federalism "have dominated the environmental regula-
tory arena since the 1970s."). 
74 Indeed, nearly all other major federal coastal and ocean legislation focuses on a sin-
gle resource or a specific environmental challenge. Examples include the Clean Water Act, 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000); the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000); the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h (2000); and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-
2761 (2000). Even the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4370f (2000), though integrative in approach, is triggered only by "major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (C) (2000). 
Moreover, NEPA is a procedural measure that does not directly command specific out-
comes. See Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 370-71 (1989). The National 
Estuary Program, 33 U.S.C. § 1330 (2000), and the National Marine Sanctuaries Act, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445c-l (2000), have integrative elements, but their geographic scope is 
considerably narrower than the CZMA's (and where these statutes overlap, the result may 
be further inconsistency). This jurisdictional balkanization has attracted the criticism of 
numerous commentators. See, e.g., BEATLEY ET AL., supra note 60, at 286-91; CICIN-SAIN & 
KNECHT, supra note 67, at 97-99, 287; Jack H. Archer & M. Casey Jarman, Sovereign Rights 
and Responsibilities: Applying Public Trust Principles to the Management of EEZ Space and Re-
sources, 17 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 253, 262 (1992); Vestal, supra note 37, at 22. 
75 How much devolution actually has occurred in practice-at least when a project or 
issue draws intense federal attention-has been questioned. See CICIN-SAIN & KNECHT, 
supra note 67, at 201 ("[T] he goals of increased state control and enhanced stakeholder 
... participation are visible everywhere. However, .... [w]ith regard to ... implementa-
tion, ... little actual devolution of authority or of funds to the states has taken place."). 
76 Rychlak, supra note 63, at 983. 
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world .... "77 And, from a state perspective, the CZMA appears to have 
weathered relatively well.78 But for others, particularly those seeking to 
site utility-scale wind farms near populated shorelines, the early signs 
point to choppy waters ahead. 
1. The General Approach 
The Coastal Zone Managemen t Act addresses a wide spectrum of 
potentially conflicting activities and uses, yet it does this in an indirect 
manner.79 Rather than attempting to command specific substantive 
results, Congress established a procedural matrix that, in its view, 
would achieve those results in practice.so Its central premise is that 
effective coastal management can arise from comprehensive state-
level planning, provided background authority is properly allocated 
among federal, state, and local officials. 
The CZMA is intended to further the protection and develop-
ment of each state's coastal zone,81 including the coastal zone's "natu-
77 Marc J. Hershman et aI., The Effectiveness of Coastal Zone Management in the United 
States, 27 COASTAL MGMT. 113, 115 (1999). 
78 Hope M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management, or Layered Federalism: 
Can Cooperative Federalism Models from Other Laws Save Our Public Lands 1, 3 W.-N .W. J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL'y 193, 205-08 (1996). Perhaps the key indicator is that thirty-four of thirty-five 
eligible coastal states and territories have developed coastal zone management programs 
that have been approved by the federal Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Manage-
ment (OCRM) pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (2000). OFFICE OF OCEAN AND COASTAL RES. 
MGMT., FEDERAL CONSISTENCY REQUIREMENTS 14 (2003), http://www.ocrm.nos.noaa.gov/ 
pdf/fedconreqmts.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2004) [hereinafter FEDERAL CONSISTENCY RE-
QUIREMENTS]. 
79 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1452 (2000). The Act declares a national policy of promoting 
"wise use" of the coastal zone, including its ecological, cultural, historic, and esthetic val-
ues, "as well as the needs for compatible economic development." Id. § 1452(2). 
80 See BEATLEY ET AL., supra note 60, at 289. 
81 As defined by the CZMA, the "coastal zone" extends seaward to the outer limit of 
state "title and ownership" (usually three statute miles), and landward as far as the state or 
other participating jurisdiction deems necessary to "control shorelands, the uses of which 
have a direct and significant impact on the coastal waters." 16 U.S.C. § 1453(1) (2000). In 
practice, the inner boundary varies widely. For instance, in Massachusetts the zone gener-
ally extends 100 feet inland of the landward side of identified coastal roads, but also in-
cludes all of Cape Cod and its offshore islands. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 21.99 
(2003). Conversely, Florida, with the second-longest U.S. coastline, includes all thirty-five 
of its shoreland counties; thus, its coastal zone encompasses the entire southern tip of the 
state, about 100 miles across. See STATE OF FLA., STATE OF HIE COAST REPORT 3 (Dec. 
1998), http:// 
www.dep.state.fl.us/secretary /legislative/ coastal! publications/ coastJeport. pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 12, 2004); see also Bruce Kuhse, The Federal Consistency Requirements of the Coastal 
Zone Management Act of 1972: It's Time to Repeal This Fundamentally Flawed Legislation, 6 
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ral, commercial, recreational, ecological, industrial and esthetic re-
sources .... "82 Each one of these goals is broad and vague. In the ag-
gregate, they serve to sharpen conflict among uses and users.83 
Reflecting the breadth and flexibility of these findings is the "great 
flexibility"84 of the Act itself. States enjoy enormous leeway in crafting 
customized coastal zone plans. These plans can and do address a di-
verse range of issues.85 Like coastal ecology itself, those issues may vary 
widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.86 The CZMA's focus on process 
means that each coastal management program tends to operate like a 
"black box"-it can generate decisions, while failing to enunciate the 
clear principles and performance standards that many believe are a 
necessary prerequisite to coherent coastal-zone management over the 
long term.87 
It is ironic that, at the time of its passage, the CZMA's main legisla-
tive competitor was a more comprehensive national land-use bill that 
would have subsumed coastal protection. Many in the environmental 
community favored this broader approach because the program would 
have been under the control of the Department of the Interior rather 
than the Department of Commerce, and because it promised a 
stronger federal hand in state decisionmaking.88 But an influential 
OCEAN & COASTAL LJ. 77, 82-83 (2001) (describing how various states have interpreted 
CZMA's vague definition of "coastal zone"). 
B216 U.S.C. § 1451(b) (2000). 
83 See CICIN-SAIN & KNECHT, supra note 67, at 65-68 (enumerating the many tensions 
within the CZMA-among them, development versus conservation-worsened by the ab-
sence of substantive program requirements and lack of guidance on how to balance na-
tional, state, and local interests). 
84 See KALO ET AL., supra note 17, at 192, 208. 
B5 For example, in the mid-1990s Massachusetts was one of the few states to address 
aquaculture. See Alison Rieser, Defining the Federal Role in Offshore Aquaculture: Should It Fea-
tureDelegation to the Statesr, 2 OCEAN & COASTAL LJ. 209, 221 (1997); see also MASS. OFFICE 
OF COASTAL ZONE MGMT., MASSACHUSETTS COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT. PLAN 86 (Mar. 
2002) (illustrating the Mass. CZMP's treatment of aquaculture), http://www.state.ma.us/ 
czm/managementplan.pdf (last visitedJan. 12,2004) [hereinafter MASS. CZMPj. 
86 Va. Elec. & Power Co., 59 Fed. Reg. 28,061 (Dep't Commerce May 31,1994) (CZMA 
objection appeal); see KALO ET AL. supra note 17, at 242. "There are no national standards 
under the CZMA. Instead, because of the unique coastal resources of each state, the CZMA 
encourages each state to develop its own standards ... to implement the [CZMA'sj policies 
and goals .... " KALo ET AL. supra note 17, at 242; see Rychlak, supra note 63, at 988. 
B7 See BEATLEY ET AL., supra note 60, at 289 (stating that federal programs "fail[] to 
evaluate coastal states against a clear set of performance standards."); CICIN-SAIN & 
KNECHT, supra note 67; Archer & Jarman, supra note 74, at 255 (finding "no unifying and 
controlling principle of resource management informs and guides" the legal regime in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone); Babcock, supra note 78, at 207. 
M See Lt. Patrick]. Gibbons,].A.G.C., U.S.N., Too Much of a Good Thing7 Federal Suprem-
acy & the Devolution of Regulatory Power: The Case of the Coastal Zone Management Act, 48 NA-
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commission89 that had been clearing the path for national shoreline 
legislation concluded that coastal managemen t should be largely the 
responsibility of the individual states. The result was a separate meas-
ure-the CZMA-guided by the principle of "cooperative federalism. "90 
The more comprehensive initiative notwithstanding, coastal policy has 
remained a matter of state and local supervision for the past three dec-
ades. Like land-use planning and zoning,91 it has been driven by dis-
trust of centralized federal direction.92 
2. The Planning Process 
The cooperative coastal zone management blueprint is not 
difficult to read. The CZMA program is voluntary, yet it has attracted 
almost unanimous participation. This has been achieved by offering 
participating states two benefits: money and a conditional power to 
block federal decisionmaking.93 To receive them, states must submit-
then implement and maintain-a qualifYing coastal management plan. 
Funding has never been generous. For all CZMA programs combined, 
it has averaged about $40 million a year, or a mere $1.2 million for each 
participating jurisdiction.94 As a result, the second inducement, so-
VAL L. REV. 84, 89,96 (2001). The more comprehensive bill was supported by President 
Richard M. Nixon. 
89 This was the U.S. Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources, 
chaired by former MIT President Julius A. Stratton. The so-called "Stratton Commission" 
was established by the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966, 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1108 (2003). The commission's report, OUR NATION AND TIlE SEA: A PLAN 
FOR NATIONAL ACTION, H.R. Doc. No. 91-42 (1969), is one of several influential coastal 
studies released in the early 1970s, and is credited as the primary impetus for passage of 
the CZMA. CICIN-SAIN & KNECHT, supra note 67, at 61; KALO ET AL., supra note 17, at 191. 
90 Cooperative federalism has also been called "contractual federalism" for its reliance 
on a set of quid pro quos. John A. Duff, The Coastal Zone Management Act; Reverse Pre-Emption 
or Contractual Federalism r, 6 OCEAN & COASTAL LJ. 109, 112 (2001); infra Part II.C. Other 
terms used are "layered federalism," for the multiple and not always coordinated regula-
tory regimes and public supervisors, and "interactive federalism," since it has not been all 
that cooperative. MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 29 
(Oxford Univ. Press ed., 1995) ("interactive federalism"); Babcock, supra note 78, at 207 
("layered federalism"). 
91 See KALo ET AL., supra note 17, at 192; Rychlak, supra note 63, at 1002, 1005. 
92 See Rychlak, mpra note 63, at 1004 & n.137. 
93 See KALO ET AL., supra note 17, at 192. 
94 See BEATLEY ET AL., supra note 60, at 103-04, 286. In the early 1970s, funding con-
sisted mainly of program development and program administration grants, and totaled 
about $30 million annually. Kuhse, supra note 81, at 83. From 1972-80, during which time 
most state programs were developed and approved, funding rose to over $101 million 
annually. See KALo ET AL., supra note 17, at 192-93. With the 1980 CZMA amendments, this 
was cut back approximately 15%. [d. Funding now totals about $50 million a year, exclusive 
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called "consistency review, "95 has come to serve as the more effective 
carrot.96 
Once a state's plan has been approved, federal coastal officials 
periodically review its implementation.97 Enforcement, however, is 
limited. Funds may be withheld only if implemen tation has failed, and 
then only after a process that can take more than three years to com-
plete.98 States, of course, may update their approved coastal zone 
management plans to meet new challenges, but they are under no 
obligation to do so. Federal authorities may not manipulate or with-
hold gran ts or other funding as a means of pressuring a state to revise 
its coastal plan.99 
A key feature of this process is the generality that is allowed, and 
indeed expected Of,IOO state coastal zone management plans. lOl This is 
enhanced by the significant discretion the CZMA accords states to 
freely interpret those plans when specific conflicts arise. Typically, the 
burden is on a project developer to demonstrate that its activities con-
form to the coastal zone plan. I02 But it is seldom possible to ensure con-
of the 50% local matching requirement for general administratiye grants. Hershman et aI., 
supra note 77, at 116; Rychlak, supra note 63, at 987. For the period 1972-2001, funding 
for all CZMA programs totaled $1.18 billion, most of it in the form of program administra-
tion grants ($844.1 million) and appropriations for the National Estuarine Research Re-
serves ($130.1 million). BEAnEY ET AL., supra note 60, at 103. In other words, most federal 
support has been directed at process, or narrowly focused on research and related activi-
ties within twenty-five estuaries located in twenty-one coastal states. See id. at 114-15. 
95 See infra Part III.C. 
96 KALO ET AL., supra note 17, at 211; see Gibbons, supra note 88, at 101; Rychlak, supra 
note 63, at 987-88, 1004. 
97 The CZMA requires that state performance be subject to ·continuing review." 16 
U.S.C. § 1458(a) (2000). Such review occurs every three years or so. KALO ET AL., supra 
note 17, at 219. 
98 See 16 U.S.C. § 1458(c); Babcock, supra note 78, at 207 n.131. 
99 See California v. Mack, 693 F. Supp. 821, 825-26 (N.D. Cal. 1988). 
100 See BEAnEY ET AL., supra note 60, at 291. 
101 This approach was approved early on: 
The Court agrees with defendants that Congress never intended that ... a 
management program ... provide a "zoning map" which would inflexibly 
commit the state in advance of receiving specific proposals to permitting par-
ticular activities in specific areas. Nor did Congress intend ... to require that 
such programs establish such detailed criteria that private users be able to 
rely on them as predictive devices for determining the fate of projects without 
interaction between the relevant state agencies and the user. 
Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Knecht, 456 F. Supp. 889, 919 (C.D. Cal. 1978), afrd, 609 F.2d 1306, 
1315 (9th Cir. 1979). The court concluded that the national interest in siting offshore 
energy facilities, even as strengthened by the 1976 CZMA amendmen ts, did not require 
state coastal plans to address national energy objectives more precisely. [d. at 919, 926. 
102 See Gibbons, supra note 88, at 102-03. 
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formity based on review of the plan document itself. To apply coastal 
program standards, more process-particularly interaction with state 
agency staff-is required.103 But if that miscarries or fails, essen tially no 
enforcement mechanism exists to set matters aright. The federal gov-
ernment exercises only limited control over how states conduct their 
review, and neither the CZMA nor the typical state coastal zone pro-
gram makes provision for aggrieved private citizens to seek judicial re-
lief from private developers, local governments, or the state itself. 104 
Although coastal zone programs vary in their priorities as well as their 
effectiveness, they all tend to operate in a zone of discretion lying be-
tween the federal government and shoreline municipalities. 105 
For wind energy, the most potentially accommodating areas of 
the overall statutory design are provisions for federal aid to the states, 
and the requirement that, to be approved, a plan must consider the 
"national interest," including "the siting of ... energy facilities which 
are of greater than local significance. "106 But each offers less than it 
appears. 
Federal aid would seem to be a way to stimulate the state innova-
tion that will be needed in many cases to accommodate wind power. 
But, beyond a modest baseline, the prospects are poor, given the his-
torically low level of federal support for coastal zone managemen t and 
renewable energy development. lo7 
Moreover, when federal agencies comment on a proposed state 
plan or an amendment to an existing one, the CZMA has been read to 
assume that a state's program addresses the national interest, including 
interest in energy security. lOS Even if conditions change later, the plan 
as written remains in effect-largely, if not wholly, immune from attack. 
103 For instance, the Massachusetts plan attempts to link (Le., to "network") a number 
of state programs, each of which has its own staff, its own regulations, and its own internal 
policies and operating procedures. See infra note 130. 
104 Babcock, supra note 78, at 207 n.131; see NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. and Energy v. 
Long Island Power Auth., 30 F.3d 403, 421-22 (3d Cir. 1994). 
105 See Babcock, supra note 78, at 206 (noting that a "state administers its coastal zone 
program without federal intrusion or even participation"). 
106 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (d) (8) (2000). 
107 See BEATLEY ET AL., supra note 60, at 288. 
108 "Inasmuch as Federal agencies are given a full opportunity to partIClpate in the 
planning process, the Committee deems it essential that Federal agencies administer their 
programs ... consistent with the States' coastal zone management program[sl." Kuhse, 
supra note 81, at 85 n.55 (quoting the 1972 Senate Report); see also KALO ET AL., supra note 
17, at 203 (focus is on adequacy of state planning process, not substantive result); Gibbons, 
supra note 88, at 102. 
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From the perspective of wind power development, the manner in 
which coastal plans are created, approved, implemented, and admin-
istered creates significant regulatory uncertainty.l09 The plans them-
selves typically do not offer specific guidelines or even basic guid-
ance-for example, guidance to help iden tilY areas in which offshore 
wind generation might be favorably considered. Instead, plans elabo-
rate upon the broad array of principles enunciated in the CZMA. 
Typically, they demand a complex balancing of related but often 
conflicting standards, while suggesting few criteria that would aid in 
discerning priorities among them. Finally, as will be discussed, the 
sheer generality of the program document makes it easier for an indi-
vidual state to argue that a federally-permitted project is inconsistent 
with some aspect ofits plan, thus blocking the siting ofthe project. l1O 
Although the CZMA's one undisputed effect has been to encour-
age states to view the coastal zone as a unified ecological area, this 
new understanding has not always inspired new modes of action. 
3. Program Structure 
a. Basic Design 
State coastal zone programs vary widely in scope,111 as well as 
structure,l12 Some, like North Carolina's and California's, are com-
prehensive and centralized. ll3 A single state agency implements the 
program, although some authority may be delegated to municipali-
109 See Robert D. Kahn, Siting Struggles: The Unique Challenge of Permitting Renewable En-
ergy Power Plants, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2000, at 21, 25. 
1\0 Because plenary federal review occurs only when a plan is first submitted or for-
mallyamended, the CZMA creates an incentive for states to prefer the general to the par-
ticular, and to prefer interpretation to revision. Others have noted that this federal-state 
tension appears to be endemic. See Hershman et aI., supra note 77, at 116-17. 
11\ See BEATIoEY ET AL., supra note 60, at 291 (noting a "wide variation in state re-
sponses"); Rychlak, supra note 63, at 985 & n.23 (noting the wide variety of concerns ad-
dressed by the CZMA). 
112 See Hershman et aI., supra note 77, at 116 n.5 (describing the five general program 
types identified in a National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
study). 
1\3 Other examples are Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, South Carolina, and 
Louisiana. A recent but unofficial program classification was provided to the author on 
Aug. 21, 2003 by David W. Kaiser, Federal Consistency Coordinator, Office of Ocean and 
Coastal Resource Management, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (table 
on file with author). 
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ties.1I4 The majority, however, are "networked" among the potentially 
numerous state and local agencies that share some say over coastal 
affairs. Often, a single state agency coordinates all or most of the oth-
ers. The Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Virginia, Florida, and 
Texas coastal zone programs are of the networked variety.ll5 Through 
executive orders, policy directives, or memoranda of understanding, 
networked coastal programs attempt to amalgamate and shape the 
preexisting activities and agendas of parallel agencies}16 
b. Spillover Effects 
For the development of offshore wind power, the structure of the 
state coastal zone management system creates a potentially serious 
boundary, or spillover, problem. 
Wind energy provides significant benefits well beyond the borders 
of a given jurisdiction-for example, by addressing climate change and 
global security issues. But a relatively small percentage of those benefits 
are captured locally. Moreover, in at least some cases, the local benefits 
of wind energy will not outweigh the locally perceived detrimen t to 
coastal "character," aesthetics, other environmental values, and other 
uses of coastal resources.117 
Although this spillover, or externality, problem is not unique to 
wind development,IIS it presents itself here in an unusual posture,1I9 
given the continuing debate over the nature and significance of the 
local impacts of wind, and the equity issues that a shoreline 
headcount cannot adequately resolve.120 
114 See, for example. the North Carolina Coastal Area Management Act. N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §§ 113A-100 to 113A-134.3 (1999). which is administered by the Division of Coastal 
Management of the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources. 
115 More than 70% of approved state programs are networked. A fifth of these (Alaska, 
Hawaii, New York, Oregon, and Washington) include an enforceable local coastal compo-
nent. 
116 The CZMA itself provides for three basic arrangements: (1) direct state regulation; 
(2) state criteria guiding local implementation, backed by state review and enforcement; 
and (3) state review of program decisions for consistency with state coastal policy. with au-
thority, after a hearing, to reject inconsistent decisions. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (11) (2000). 
117 This is not necessarily to agree with these allegations of harm, only to acknowledge 
them. If wind power is considered benign, the special problems of coastal regulation may 
recede. For all types of wind projects. though, the need for supportive federal policies and 
more direct demonstration of benefits will remain. 
liB BEATLEY ET AL., supra note 60, at 297; Kahn, supra note 109, at 27 & n.2l. 
119 C/, Gibbons, supra note 88, at 109 (noting that coastal management plans "encode 
state cost considerations· -which is another permutation of the spillover effect). 
120 The point is that a relatively high percentage of coastal property not only is in pri-
vate hands, but also is in the hands of a particularly affluent constituency. In Massachu-
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c. Massachusetts: A Case in Point 
To understand why state territorial waters might be an unfriendly 
environment for wind development, it may be useful to examine a 
specific, representative coastal zone management program. The Massa-
chusetts program has received high marks,121 and, like the majority, is a 
networked program. In addition, the state has a fairly typical range of 
environmental statutes, including those that address environmental 
impacts, the siting of power plants, ocean protection, and public trust 
resources. 
The commonwealth's coastal program is based on at least seven 
memoranda of understanding between the Massachusetts Office of 
Coastal Zone Management and the other state agencies that exercise 
supervisory authority over use and development of the coastline.122 
These include the state Energy Facilities Siting Board, the Executive 
Office of Transportation and Construction, the Massachusetts Envi-
setts, for instance, 73% of all coastal land was privately owned in 1990, with public access 
limited to an average of one spot every mile in urban areas and one every three miles in 
rural areas. The percentage of privately-owned land may have decreased to 59% by 2001, 
however. See SURFRIDER FOUND., STATE OF TIlE BEACH 2003 (Massachusetts Summary), at 
http://beach.com/stateofthebeach/6-state/beach_access.asp?state=MA (last visited Jan. 
12,2004). Coastal settings can have a significant positive effect on property values and real 
estate prices. See TENN. VALLEY Au'll!., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL AsSESSMENT-20-MW 
WINDFARM AND AsSOCIATED ENERGY STORAGE FACILITY, app. F (Apr. 2002), http://www. 
tva.gov/environment/reports/windfarm/appendixJpdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2004); Ok-
myung Bin & Stephen Polasky, Valuing Inland and Coastal Wetlands in a Rural Setting 
Using Parametric and Semi-Parametric Hedonic Models 4-5, 18 (2003) (unpublished 
working paper) (finding large premium in property values for ·ocean or sOllnd frontage 
and for proximity to the ocean"), http://www.ecll.edu/ econ/wp/03/ ecu0305.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2004). 
121 Telephone Interview with David W. Kaiser, Federal Consistency Coordinator, Office 
of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admini-
stration (Aug. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Kaiser interview]. 
122 Most of these seven documents were signed in 1977, a year before the Massachu-
setts coastal zone program obtained federal approval. They are very general in nature. For 
instance, the state Energy Facility Siting Board (EFSB), which must approve proposals to 
build all major power plants, has agreed to coordinate with the state's coastal zone man-
agement office, recognize the state's coastal plan, and act consistently with its policies. 
MASS. CZMP, supra note 85, at app. E. But the coastal plan imposes only one specific re-
quirement on the EFSB-heightened review of projects in areas of critical environmental 
concern-and this has minimal if any impact on offshore wind power. [d. at 77. And the 
most specific requirement in the EFSB's undated two-page memorandum of understand-
ing with the coastal management office is that the former will require developers of pro-
posed coastal power plants to suggest at least one inland alternative site. [d., at app. E. In 
mid-2003, all seven of the MOUs were in the process of revision. E-mail from Jane W. 
Mead, Senior Project Review Coordinator, Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone Manage-
ment, to Rusty Russell (Aug. 21, 2003, 19:36:01 EST) (on file with author). 
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ronmental Policy Act Office, the Department of Agricultural Resources, 
and the Departmen t of Conservation and Recreation.123 
State law does not provide the public with the means to challenge 
action or inaction by coastal officials, or to require the coastal office 
to enforce its agreements with other agencies-although two review 
processes might help. First, in many cases (especially those involving 
sizable coastal incursions), a factual record detailing environmental 
harms and benefits must be developed, largely through the common-
wealth's environmental impact review process.124 Second, the Energy 
Facilities Siting Board has the authority, but not the obligation, to fa-
cilitate the siting of for power generation projects by waiving local and 
state permitting requirements.125 
Nonetheless, the Massachusetts regulatory system poses a number 
of challenges to offshore wind development. The first is its sheer com-
plexity.126 Multiple sets of regulations address similar activities in similar 
language, yet they do so in seemingly uncoordinated and sometimes 
inconsistent ways.127 As ~ result, wind development may be diverted to 
123 MASS. CZMP, supra note 85, at app. E. 
124 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30, §§ 61-62H (2002). The Massachusetts Environmental 
Policy Act (MEPA), unlike its federal counterpart, can require the mitigation of specified 
project impacts. Id. § 61; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.07(6)(j) (1998); see, e.g., ELLEN Roy 
HERZFELDER, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ENVTL. AFFAIRS, CERTIFICATE OF TIlE SECRE'l1l.RY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS ON TIlE FINAL 2000 L.G. HANSCOM FIELD ENVIRONMENTAL STATUS 
AND PLANNING REpORT, EOEA No. 5484/8696, at 5-6 (Aug. 14,2003), http://www.state.ma. 
us/ envir /mepa/pdffiles/ certificates/FESPR8696.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2004). 
125 Although the EFSB no longer assesses the need for proposed generating projects, it 
continues to review their environmental impacts and consistency with state energy policies. 
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 164, §§ 69G, 69J, 69Jl/4 (2002). As with other agency review in-
volving coastal resources, the siting board typically relies on data developed in the MEPA 
environmental impact assessment process. Id.§ 69Ll/2. But, unlike other agencies, it is not 
required to do so. Id. § 69Kl/2. 
126 See, e.g., MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 9.33(1) (2003); MASS. OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE 
MGMT., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ENVTL. AFFAIRS, ENVIRONMENTAL PERMTTITNG IN MASSACHU-
SETTS 2-3 (2003), http://www.state.ma.us/czm/envpermittoc.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2004). 
127 For instance, the state's Public Waterfront Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 91, §§ 1-63 
(2002), may effectively bar near-shore wind projects unless they are deemed to be coastal 
uses. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 9.01 (definition of "infrastructure crossing facility"), 
9.12,9.21,9.32(1) (a), 9.36(4), 9.51 (2),9.51 (3)(a), 9.51 (3)(e) (2000). Recently, the state's 
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), which administers chapter 91, deter-
mined that none of the pending proposals off the Massachusetts coast, see supra note 5, are 
water dependent, and therefore must obtain a variance, a cumbersome and uncertain 
process. See Letter from Philip Weinberg, Acting DEP Commissioner, to Ellen Roy Her-
zfelder, Secretary of the Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (May 26, 
2003) (on file with author). The enforceable portion of the state's coastal zone plan, how-
ever, is more ambiguous on this score. Compare MASS. CZMP, supra note 85, at 78 (stating 
that an energy facility is coastally dependent if, inter alia, it transmits energy from an en-
ergy facility in the coastal zone to an inland location), with MASS. CZMP, supra note 85, at 
244 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 31:22 J 
federal waters, if any shallow enough can be found. 128 The second chal-
lenge is the generality ofthe standards,129 They demand a great deal of 
interpretation, which increases transaction costs. Third, the coastal 
zone itself is a "generalized" space, creating further uncertainty. Most, if 
not all, of the values that its varied resources support may require as-
sessment each time a significant project triggers the commonwealth's 
coastal protection apparatus. Although the process this necessitates 
may be adept at identifYing discrete interests and values, it may be far 
less effective in translating those findings into specific conditions that 
apply to designated activities in specified locations. Fourth, a high de-
gree of generality may be favored as a way to conserve agency re-
sources, if not ocean resources. The more precise a given policy or de-
cision, the clearer it acts as directive or precedent. Agencies may seek to 
avoid such precision, since one of its by-products is the assignment of 
priority to values and uses-and in consequence intensifYing the de-
mand for hands-on, and often controversial, resource management. 
79 (energy facilities are not coastally dependent with the exception of those using ocean 
thermal, wave, or tidal power to generate electricity), and MASS. CZMP, supra note 85, at 
81 ("wind power generation[] may be determined to be coastally dependent based on the 
nature of the specific project proposal"). Although the EFSB, to which the coastal plan's 
offshore power provisions most directly relate, has the authority to waive virtually all state 
and local requirements, it has not done so for wind power. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 164, 
§§ 69K, 69Kl/2 (2002). Conversely, the unenforceable portion of the state's coastal plan 
"encourage[s] ... the use of alternative [energy] sources such as solar and wind power," 
provided they have "minimal impacts on coastal resources and uses." MASS. CZMP, supra 
note 85, at 85 (Energy Management Principle #1). It even endeavors to "assist in locating 
appropriate sites .... " [d. Management principles are not enforceable coastal zone poli-
cies, and thus have no legal force. [d. at 11. On the other hand, the Ocean Sanctuaries Act, 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 132A, §§ 12A-16F (2002)-which also is networked into the Massa-
chusetts coastal program-expressly prohibits the construction of offshore electricity gen-
erating stations in the Cape Cod Ocean Sanctuary, which encompasses all of Cape Cod Bay 
and the state waters adjacent to the remainder of the Cape and its offshore islands. Al-
though the relevant regulations are contradictory on this score, the Ocean Sanctuaries Act 
also may sharply limit or prohibit such development elsewhere. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 
302, §§ 5.07-.08 (2003) (compare §§ 5.07(I)(b) and 5.08(1) and (4». Nearly all of the 
state's waters are in one of five designated ocean sanctuaries. Telephone interview with 
Michael Gildesgame, Director, Office of Water Resources, Massachusetts Department of 
Conservation and Recreation (Aug. 8, 2003). 
128 See LONG ISLAND'S WIND POTENTIAL, supra note 12, at Executive Summary i; see also 
supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
129 The enforceable standards that network to other regulatory programs are ex-
pressed in such general terms as: "preserve," "protect," "restore," "enhance," "ensure that 
... potential adverse effects are minimized," "giv[e] due consideration to," "obtain the 
widest possible public benefit," and "weigh the environmental and safety impacts." MASS. 
CZMP, supra note 85, at 32, 38, 49, 57, 77. Although standards are essential to all regula-
tory systems, the breadth of these particular standards may impede efficient resolution of 
increasingly intense conflicts among diverse coastal interests. 
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Finally, the commonwealth's coastal program appears to be ambivalent 
about whether wind power should be encouraged or not.130 Some 
coastal zone management provisions seem to treat the resource as a 
potentiallywater-dependent activity that should be favored. Others lean 
in the opposite direction.131 This adds to the regulatory uncertainty. 
Whether wind generation will be sited off the Massachusetts coast 
remains an open question. But the regulatory pathway that will deter-
mine the fate of each proposal has more twists than necessary.132 This 
does not mean the Massachusetts program is particularly weak. In fact, 
survey results tabulated in Appendix A suggest that the commonwealth 
is considerably farther along than most other eastern seaboard states in 
reconsidering its coastal program in light of the evident potential for 
utility-scale wind power in or near state waters. 133 
But the bottom line is the same: near-shore wind power's poten-
tial is being dissipated by a decentralized system ill-suited to this new 
regulatory challenge. One unintended consequence is that develop-
ers will propose more massive projects, on the assumption that the 
ensuing negotiation will demand broader concessions, and that-
given a basic lack of structure-the negotiation will impose additional 
costs that can be offset only by the extra revenue generated by more 
or larger turbines. Yet, this dynamic could easily heighten regulatory 
scrutiny, with the consequence that the entire project ultimately is 
130 See infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
131 See infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
U2 See Kuhse, supra note 81, at 105 (observing that "[tlhe CZMA encourages redun-
dancy in local, state, and federal agencies .... The divided, excessive authority is costly, 
inconvenient, and erodes public confidence in government."). Other commentators, if 
less insistent, have hardly been less critical. See, e.g., BEA'ILEY ET AL., supra note 60, at 286-
87; Babcock, supra note 78, at 207. 
133 Data in the table were collected by the author from the sources noted. In March 2003, 
Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney announced an Ocean Management Initiative, followed 
inJune by the appointment of a twenty-three-member Ocean Management Task Force. The 
task force is to "provide a structure for developing ocean management plans within state wa-
ters," while reviewing existing conflicts and recommending regulatory changes. Near-shore 
wind power is one of a number of issues expected to influence discussion. See John Leaning, 
Ocean Protection Plan Outlined, CAPE COD TIMES, Dec. 5, 2003, http://www.capecodonline. 
com/speciallwindfarm/oceanprotection5.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2004); Press Release, 
Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs, Massachusetts Ocean Management Task Force Named 
(June 4, 2003) http://www.state.ma.us/envir/eoea/pressre1eases/060303_0cean_Manage-
ment_tf.pdf (last visited Jan. 12,2004); MASS. OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MGMT., EXECUTIVE 
OFFICE OF ENV'IL. AFFAIRS, MASSACHUSETTS OCEAN MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, at http:/ / 
www.state.ma.us/czm/omitaskforce.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2004). 
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rejected. That outcome, however, is not consistent with existing policy 
in any coastal state. 
C. (In)Consistency 
The most unusual feature of the CZMA and the one that has 
drawn the most attention from courts and commentators is consistency 
review, its single, clear enforcement mechanism.134 In brief, consistency 
review permits a state whose coastal zone is affected by a federal or fed-
erally-permitted project135 to file an objection, and thereby either halt 
the project or force its modification-if the project is found to be in-
compatible with an enforceable component of that state's federally-
approved coastal zone management plan.136 
Consistency has attracted wide commentary.137 Whether it hands 
states "veto" power over activities that may harm the coastal zone, or 
134 See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (2000). 
135 Review standards and procedures differ slightly depending on whether the project is 
conducted directly by the federal government, or whether it is federally licensed, permitted, 
approved, or funded. Because the typical wind power project is privately promoted and seeks 
several federal permits and approvals, this Article will focus on licensing, permitting, and 
approvals under 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (3) (A) and (c) (3)(B). Whether a project is inside or 
outside of state waters, the most likely federal approvals are a section 10 permit from the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, 33 
U.S.C. § 403 (regarding construction in any navigable waterway), a determination from the 
Federal Aviation Administration under 14 C.F.R. §§ 77.5 (a), 77.13(a) (1), 77.23, 77.33(a)(2) 
(2003) (regarding structures more than 200 feet high), authorization from the U.S Coast 
Guard under 33 C.F.R. § 64.21 (regarding potential navigational hazards), and at least some 
review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d. See 
MASS. Rms. CODE tit. 301, § 2l.07(2) (1999) (listing activities requiring federal licenses be-
cause of their likely effect on the coastal zone). At this point, the contours of the regulatory 
process for offshore wind development are not fully charted. See LONG ISLAND'S WIND Po-
TEN'IlAL, supra note 12, at 21. 
136 With regard to federal permitting, the exact language is: "[a]fter final approval by 
the Secretary [of Commerce] of a state's [coastal zone] management program, any appli-
cant for a required Federal license or permit to conduct an activity, in or outside of the 
coastal zone, affecting any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone of that 
state shall provide ... certification that the proposed activity complies with the enforceable 
policies of the state's approved [coastal zone management] program .... " 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1456(c)(3)(A) (2000). The provisions of section 1456(c) (3)(B), which apply to explora-
tion and development of the Outer Continental Shelf, are similar. See id. § 1456(c) (3) (B). 
"Effect" is defined broadly to mean anything "reasonably foreseeable" that has an impact 
on coastal resources or coastal uses. 15 C.F.R. § 930.11 (g) (2003). For a useful official 
summary of the entire process, see FEDERAL CONSISTENCY REQUIREMENTS, supra note 78. 
137 E.g., Gibbons, supra note 88, at 101-10; Vestal, supra note 37, at 56-58. Compare 
Kuhse, supra note 81, and Scott C. Whitney et aI., State Implementation of the Coastal Zone 
Management Consistency Provisions-Ultra Vires or Unconstitutional?, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
67 (1988), with Jack Archer & Joan Bondareff, Implementation of the Federal Consistency Doc-
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whether its effects are more subtle and less predictable, is a matter of 
continuing discussionY:l8 Nonetheless, when adopted in 1972, the con-
sistency provision represented "a significant innovation."139 More than 
three decades later, it continues to carry symbolic, and potentially real, 
force. l40 Indeed, responding to a 1984 Supreme Court decision limiting 
its scope,141 Congress in 1990 amended the CZMA to allow states to re-
view the coastal impact of federal actions in federal waters.142 
Consistency is important here because it gives states the power to 
reject an offshore143 wind power facility, even one to be built outside 
the state's three-mile territorial limit. Although disagreement continues 
regarding the scope of the power and its overall utility,144 in state hands 
consistency review operates like a one-way ratchet. IT a state does not 
want to encourage offshore wind, or wants to discourage a particular 
proposal, consistency review potentially serves to deflect both the de-
veloper's request for federal approvals and a federal government--or at 
least a federal agency-that is supportive of renewable energy}45 On 
trine-Lawful and Constitutional: A Response to Whitney,Joltnson & Perles, 12 HARV. ENV'IL. L. 
REV. 115 (1988), and Duff, supra note 90, at 112-17. 
138 The mere fact that consistency review exists could reasonably be expected to dis-
courage or force the revision of some proposals. Nevertheless, as is true of NEPA, effects of 
this type are difficult to isolate, and even harder to subject to controlled study. See Bradley 
C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government's Environmental 
Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 911 & n.25 (2002). 
159 CICIN-SAIN & KNECHT, supra note 67, at 100 ("[F]or the first time, states could 
influence the conduct of federal activities inside and [at times] outside of state waters. "). 
140 Compare Babcock, supra note 78, at 205 (stating that consistency provisions give 
states "considerable leverage"), with KALO ET AL., supra note 17, at 217 (finding "litde evi-
dence that the states have abused any preemptive authority [consistency] may have given 
them"). 
141 Sec'y ofthe Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312,315 (1984). 
142 See Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 
§ 6201, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-299 to -319 (1990); Andrew Solomon, Comment, Section 6217 
oftke Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990: Is There Any Point', 31 ENV'IL. L. 
151,156 n.43 (2001). 
143 It also extends landward to the inland edge of states' coastal zones, the boundaries 
of which vary widely. See supra note 81. A large-scale wind farm sited in the terrestrial part 
of the coastal zone also would require federal approvals, see supra note 135, and most likely 
would "affect" the zone. 
144 Compare CICIN-SAIN & KNECHT, supra note 67, at 198 (noting that consistency re-
view "has worked well as a mechanism for ensuring harmony in the actions of federal and 
state agencies"), and BEA'ILEY ET AL., supra note 60, at 106 (concluding that "consistency 
doctrine ... appears to strike a balance between state interests and national economic and 
security interests"), with Kuhse, supra note 81, at 78 (stating that the process is "fundamen-
tally flawed," "unfair and costly," "superfluous," and "obnoxious"). 
145 As noted, developers will likely opt for sites in federal waters, if available. See supra 
note 128. Not only is federal permitting less politically and legally complex than its state 
counterparts, state regulations often will supply a number of independent bases for deny-
248 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 31:221 
the other hand, if state policy seeks to encourage near-shore wind, con-
sistency review is irrelevan t; it cannot be used to force a federal agency 
to license a project. As for the federal agency itself, consistency is not an 
option. The ratchet turns only one way. Thus, the CZMA is more than 
simply non-preemptive; it engages in a form of reverse preemption.146 
Of course, if a project is opposed by both state and federal officials, the 
mechanism is not relevant. 
But even if most agree that the consistency doctrine is more than 
a hobgoblin, is it in fact a barrier to projects like an offshore wind 
farm? No formal analysis has addressed this question. 147 Yet, the way 
in which the process plays out suggests that it might not be a substan-
tial barrier. State consistency objections to federal license and permit 
applications are reviewed by the Secretary of Commerce.148 The Sec-
retary may override an objection if the proposal is found to be consis-
tent with the objectives of the CZMA, or if it is otherwise essential to 
national security.149 In the first instance, the Secretary must base a 
consistency finding on each of three criteria, one of which also re-
quires the presence of a strong national interest. 150 As the discussion 
ing approval. See Rychlak, supra note 63, at 993. Many of these would do so even if they 
were not networked into the coastal program. In Massachusetts for example, much of the 
commonwealth's territorial sea lies in one of five protected ocean sanctuaries, and its 
complex public trust protections, embodied in MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 91, apply to the entire 
seaward coastal zone. See supra note 127. At a more general level, a larger percentage of a 
given state's coastal zone is likely to be subject to heavy regulation than the federal waters 
immediately beyond it. Even if this is not the case, the federal consistency mechanism may 
permit a state to review projects within its territorial waters, even projects it could not oth-
erwise directly regulate. Finally, the consistency mechanism offers states some insurance 
against the potential preemptive effects of federal laws. 
146 See, e.g., SEC'y OF COMMERCE, DECISION AND FINDINGS IN 'niE CONSISTENCY APPEAL 
OF TIfE VIRGINIA ELECTIUC AND POWER COMPANY }'ROM AN OBJECTION BY .. HE NORTIf 
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL, HEAL TIf AND NATURAL RESOURCES 17 (May 
19,1994), http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/czma/vepc.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2004); see also 
supra notes 145-46. 
147 Kaiser interview, supra note 121. 
148 16 U.S.C. §§ 1453(16), 1456(c) (3) (A) (2000). 
149 The test is whether "a defense or other national security interest would be 
significantly impaired were the activity not permitted .... " 15 C.F.R. § 930.122 (2003). 
This is a test not likely to be met by most civilian endeavors. Indeed, this provision has 
never been invoked to override a state finding. FEDERAL CONSISTENCY REQUIREMENTS, 
supra note 78, at app. D; Kaiser interview, supra note 121. 
150 The Secretary must find that: (i) the proposal significantly or substantially furthers 
the national interest, as expressed in the CZMA's congressional findings or declaration of 
policy, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1452 (both of which are very broad); (ii) the identified national 
interest outweighs the project's adverse coastal impact; and (iii) no reasonable alternative 
exists that is consistent with the state's enforceable coastal policies. 15 C.F.R. § 930.121. For 
the override petitions that have been denied (about half the total) the Secretary deter-
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below suggests, if review by the Secretary has had any impact at all, it 
has helped to stimulate oil and gas exploration on the Outer Conti-
nen tal Shelf.151 Whether it also might be of assistance to offshore wind 
power projects is questionable, given long-standing federal energy 
policy. 
Indeed, initial data suggest that the consistency doctrine has had 
minimal impact. The simple truth is that most states go along with most 
federal licensing decisions almost all of the time. The federal Office of 
Ocean and Coastal Resource Management estimates that states have 
consented to approximately ninety-five percent of all reviewable federal 
actions. 152 Nonetheless, of the forty cases decided on petition to the 
Secretary of Commerce since the early 1980s, more than a third have 
involved energy exploration.153 The Secretary upheld the state's objec-
tion in half of them. l54 Although one cannot confidently declare this a 
trend, it underscores a tendency that may be of importance to near-
shore wind generation: states scrutinize big projects c1osely.155 Even 
though such proposals have been relatively infrequent, such consis-
tently searching scrutiny, over time, may create a powerful preference 
for the status quO. 156 
By deterring or forcing the revision 157 of unsound projects, the 
consistency provisions also may exercise a more influence in situations 
that do not result in a negative determination by the state. Although no 
mined that the first criterion had not been met in 5% of the cases, the second one in 67% 
of the cases, and the third in 28% of them. FEDERAL CONSISn:NCY REQUIREMENTS, supra 
note 78, at app. D. 
151 The political winds also could be a major factor. Historically they have favored oil 
and gas, while shifting from mildly antagonistic towards, to modestly supportive of, wind 
power. In addition, wind developers are unlikely to match the resources that the oil and 
gas industry can marshal to prosecute consistency review before the Commerce Depart-
ment. Finally, the regulations themselves contemplate an ad hoc review process-one not 
bound by precedent or even by the factual record developed before the state. See 15 C.F.R. 
§ 930.121(c). 
152 See FEDERAL CONSISn:NCY REQUIREMENTS, supra note 78, app. D, at 1. This per-
centage is derived from all federal actions described by 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(I)(A), (c)(2), 
and (c)(3). 
153 FEDERAL CONSISn:NCY REQUIREMENTS, supra note 78, app. D, at I, 5. 
154 [d. at 5. 
155 It has been noted, however, that large commercial projects may fare better than 
others in the consistency review process-at least if they involve offshore oil and gas explo-
ration, an energy production strategy favored by several presidents. See Kuhse, supra note 
81, at 101, 103. 
156 See infra Part II.D. for further discussion of thi~ point. 
157 As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently noted, a license applicant may gen-
erally amend its application and resubmit it. California v. Norton, 311 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th 
Cir.2002). 
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formal study has quantified this effect,158 most projects not initially 
deemed consistent are modified through negotiation.159 A recent 
amendment to the CZMA regulations underscores the role of negotia-
tion, particularly between states and project proponents. 160 
When Congress enacted the CZMA, it accorded exceptional 
authority to states rather than to municipalities in the belief that the 
former would better reflect the national interest and thus could 
achieve broader consensus around any given coastal issue.161 Al-
though con troversial to some, offshore wind generation has the ca-
pacity to deliver significant environmental benefits to constituencies 
far larger and more dispersed than those who live within eyeshot. 
Nonetheless, any proposed development that lacks strong local politi-
cal support is likely to run into difficulty if it is to be sited in state ter-
ritorial waters. 162 
Nearly three decades of experience supports the conclusion that 
the coastal zone management program is not sufficiently we ll-
coordinated to manage significant challenges unanticipated in 1972 
or at the time of any of the Act's later amendments. One of these 
challenges is offshore wind. 
D. The Deceptive Authority of the Oil and Gas Meta-Narrative 
The CZMA and fossil fuel exploration share a turbulent history. 
The Act, often to good effect, main tains a tension between state policy 
and federal prerogative. During the Reagan Administration's campaign 
in the early 1980s to promote the development of offshore oil and gas 
deposits, some states took advantage of the consistency review process 
to try to block exploration, while others flatly refused to draft coastal 
158 Kaiser interview, supra note 121; see supra note 138. 
159 KALO ET AL., supra note 17, at 217. 
160 15 C.F.R. § 930.4, added in 2000, directs applicants for federal licenses and permits 
to "cooperate with State agencies to develop conditions that, if agreed to [during state 
consistency review] ... would allow the State agency to concur with the federal action." 15 
C.F.R. § 930.4(a) (2003). IT bargaining fails, a state must describe the unsatisfied condi-
tions in the consistency objection it makes to federal authorities. 15 C.F.R. § 930.4(b). For 
the state to prevail, those conditions must be needed to ensure consistency with enforce-
able state policies, although, as noted, enforceable policies may be derived from exceed-
ingly broad standards. See supra notes 132-137 and accompanying text. 
161 See Gibbons, supra note 88, at 101. 
162 See, e.g., Stephanie Ebbert, Kennedy Retreats on Wind Farm Amendment, BOSTON 
GLOBE, July 31,2003, at Bl; Stephanie Ebbert, On Wind, Some Blow Hot and Cold, BOSTON 
GLOBE, June 17, 2003, at AI. 
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zone management plans that identified areas suitable for energy ex-
ploitation.163 
Since then, power has alternately tilted toward and away from the 
states, while at the same time the policy pendulum has moved from 
environmental protection to energy development, and then back 
again. Responding to the gasoline price spike of the early 1970s,164 the 
1976 CZMA amendments165 underscored an intensified federal inter-
est in fossil fuel supplies by directing states with approved coastal 
management plans to address the need for, and the siting and opera-
tional impacts of, energy extraction in the coastal zone.166 
The 1976 amendments included a program to compensate states 
affected by oil and gas development on the Outer Continental Shelf. 
Fourteen years later, the fund was repealed by another set of amend-
ments,167 the most important of which was to extend state consistency 
review to activities that, although conducted outside the coastal zone, 
might have impacts within it.168. The amendments also established a 
smaller fund to advance environmental objectives, and to promote 
"procedures and enforceable policies to help facilitate the siting of 
energy facilities and ... energy-related activities ... which may be of 
greater than local significance."169 Overall, the 1990 amendments 
have realigned the coastal zone program with what is widely viewed to 
be its primary purpose: environmental protection.170 The most recent 
set of regulatory changes, promulgated in 2000, make slight adjust-
men ts in consistency review. Their preamble iden tifies energy facility 
163 KALO ET AL., supra note 17, at 193. 
164 See CICIN-SAIN & KNECHT, supra note 67, at 103, 107-08; Gibbons, supra note 88, at 
96. 
166 Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-370, 90 Stat. 
1013 (1976). 
166 Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Knecht, 456 F. Supp. 889, 919, 922-23 (C.D. Cal. 1978), afld, 
609 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1979). 
167 Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 
§ 6201, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-299 to -319 (1990). 
168 Potential impacts would, of course, include energy exploration on the Outer Con-
tinental Shelf. See CICIN-SAIN & KNECHT, supra note 67, at 114. 
169 16 U.S.C. § 1456b(a) (8) (2000). The objectives on the list now number nine, and 
include the "[a]doption of procedures and policies to evaluate and facilitate the siting of 
public and private aquaculture facilities in the coastal zone .... " 16 U.S.C. § 1456b(a)(9). 
This provision was added in 1996. Coastal Zone Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
150, § 7(2), 110 Stat. 1380, 1382 (1996). 
170 See Am. Petroleum [nst, 456 F. Supp. at 919 ("CZMA ... [is] first and foremost a stat-
ute directed to and solicitous of environmental concerns."); Gibbons, supra note 88, at 96. 
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sItmg as an aCtiVIty that "significantly" advances the national in ter-
est.!7! The pendulum may be swinging back again.172 
Wind power sits on a ridge between environmental protection 
and economic development. Offshore, it constantly risks being per-
ceived as the new century's version of big oil-a corporate behemoth 
seeking to expropriate the Outer Continental Shelf. The issue is not 
whether wind energy and fossil fuel combustion have vastly different 
impacts on the environment.173 Clearly they do. Rather, wind power 
proponents will have to reject the simplistic analogy to oil and gas ex-
ploration and avoid being characterized by the narrative that has 
emerged from it. 174 To the exten t this fails, regulators will be more 
likely to conclude that offshore wind projects negatively affect the 
coastal environment and coastal uses.!75 Given past patterns, the fed-
171 See Coastal Zone Management Act Federal Consistency Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg. 
77,124,77,150 (Dec. 8, 2000) (codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 930). This language may help to sup-
port consistency overrides under 15 C.F.R. § 930.121 (a) (2003). 
172 One factor that may exercise a subtle but continuing influence on perceptions of 
the CZMA is that this Act, unlike many other national environmental statutes, was funda-
mentally a creature of the legislative branch. CICIN-SAIN & KNECHT, supm note 67, at 101. 
It encompasses one of Congress's earliest (and still one of its few) expressions of full-
fledged environmental federalism. The irony of this extends beyond the Nixon administra-
tion. See supm notes 92-95 and accompanying text. States' rights presidents like Ronald 
Reagan championed offshore oil and gas development, only to find themselves in head-to-
head conflict with individual coastal states. Thus, the CZMA may continue to be relatively 
popular in part because it is viewed as a congressional gift of devolution. 
173 While the capacity of poorly-sited wind generators to endanger birds cannot be dis-
missed, the fact remains that a number of recent, peer-reviewed studies conclude that fossil 
fuel generation shortens the lives of up to 60,000 people each year in the United States. See 
ABT Assocs., INC., ThE PARTICULATE-RELATED HEALTII BENEFITS OF RI:DUCING POWER 
PLANT EMISSIONS 6-4 (2000), http://www.catf.us/publications/reports/ Abt]MJeport.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2004). 
174 For an example of this, see RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY PROJECT, OnSHORE WIND 
FARM APPROVAL PROCESS, NOR'"IH CAROLINA 9 (undated report), available at http://www. 
repp.org/ articles/ static/ 1 /binaries/REPP _ Offshore_ Wind_Approval. pdf (last visited Jan. 
12,2004). 
[d. 
[A]n offshore wind farm is a new concept. However, other coastal develop-
ments, such as oil and gas platforms, have been around for decades .... Off-
shore wind farms and oil/gas platforms are similar in that both (a) are en-
ergy-related activities, (b) require the installation of structures in U.S. 
navigable waters, (c) are potentially visible from the shoreline, and (d) may 
affect the coastal zone. 
175 The range of activities that can affect the coastal zone may be expansive enough to 
encompass the aesthetic impacts of wind turbines. See 15 C.F.R. § 930.11 (g) (2003); H.R. 
CONF. REP. No. 101-964, at 970 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2374, 2675 ("the 
term 'affecting' is to be construed broadly"). Indeed, states may be encouraged in this 
direction, given that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also interprets its section 10 juris-
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eral government is unlikely to shore up organized wind power so it 
can do battle with the states. I76 
III. COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT: THE LINE AND THE SAND 
The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), standing alone, is 
often depicted as a moderately successful-albeit unusual-example 
oflegislation that attempts to integrate environmental protection with 
resource management and development,I77 while simultaneously en-
hancing principles of federalism. 178 But when the inquiry is recast as a 
general assessmen t of U.S. coastal policy, the prevalen t view is sharply 
critical. I79 
A. The Fickle Foundations of Federalism 
More than seventy years ago Justice Brandeis set down his now-
famous observation that a "single courageous State may ... serve as a 
laboratory" for "novel social and economic experiments .... "ISO Al-
though he was writing in dissen t, there is general agreemen t that the 
"happy incident" of federalism can provide the necessary space for 
states to test promising policy innovations. ISI Indeed, state activism 
may help dissolve federal impasse, while checking the wider spread of 
misguided public programs. 
Justice Brandeis may not have been considering the challenge of 
modern environmen tal protection when he suggested that states ex-
periment with economic and social policy. Indeed, when the prob-
lems those policies seek to address have significant extrajurisdictional 
impacts, state experimentation may fail. In addition, the rigorous 
diction very expansively-expressly considering aesthetics, for example. 33 C.F.R. 
§ 320.4(a) (1) (stating that § 10 review requires "careful weighing of all those factors which 
become relevant in each particular case," including aesthetics, economics, general envi-
ronmental concerns, energy needs, navigation, and sixteen others); see supra note 136. 
176 See NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 9, at 6, 21 (proposing 
increased use of renewable resources on federal lands, but barely mentioning of£~hore 
wind power). 
177 See BEAnEY ET AL., supra note 60, at 102. 
178 See Babcock, supra note 78, at 205-08. 
179 E.g., Oliver A. Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America's Coastal Zone, 47 MD. 
L. REV. 358, 362 (1988) ("We have created a Dr. Seuss-like machine that produces occa-
sionally good, but more often poor, compromises at the end of an elaborate pipeline."). 
180 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,]., dissenting). 
181 Id (Brandeis,]., dissenting); see Babcock, supra note 78, at 207; Richard L. Revesz, 
Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 558, 
583 (2001) (contending that many state environmental initiatives are stronger than their 
federal counterparts). 
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practice of federalism can obstruct or delay the realization of national 
goals and implementation of national norms. lS2 By exacerbating the 
spillover effect, it also may generate significant external costS.I83 
Though proposed as an environmental improvement rather than 
a problem, utility-scale offshore wind generation runs the risk of be-
coming a victim of federalism. To avoid this result, while providing 
review procedures that properly balance local, regional, and national 
interests, administrative coordination and broader consideration of 
social costs and benefits are needed. Otherwise, the final irony will be 
harsh: offshore wind turbines could become harder to site than oil 
platforms. l84 
B. Observations & Recommendations 
The current coastal zone management regime may represent both 
the best prospect for the coordinated siting of wind generation and the 
biggest impediment to any siting at all. l85 When conflicts arise in the 
coastal zone-often the result of a specific development challenge-
the solutions suggested frequently are systemic in nature. These 
include assigning responsibility to the agency believed to be the most 
expert,l86 and placing greater reliance on other branches of govern-
ment. lS7 
182 See Babcock, supra note 78, at 208. 
183 See supra Part II.B.3.b. Professor Revesz, who is no proponent of command-and-
control regulation, observes: "The presence of interstate externalities is a compelling ar-
gument for federal regulation "-particularly in the face of "large-scale and complex envi-
ronmental problems" and the "shifting composition of affected states"-either of which 
"makes cooperation even less likely." Revesz, supra note 181, at 557 n.3; see Gibbons, supra 
note 88, at 100 (noting that decentralized approaches may fail to account for free-rider 
and holdout effects). In addition, decentralization action may exclude a significant num-
ber of citizens from essential decision making processes. [d. at 99. 
184 See Kahn, supra note 109, at 21-23. 
185 See BEA'lLEY ET AL., supra note 60, at 283 ("current planning and management sys-
tems are ... not up to the challenge" posed by contemporary coastal conflicts). 
186 See D. Douglas Hopkins et aI., An Environmental Critique of Government Regulations 
and Policies for Open Ocean Aquaculture, 2 OCEAN & COASTAL LJ. 235, 257-58 (1997); Rieser, 
supra note 85, at 231 (suggesting that National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admini~tration 
(NOAA) alone, or NOAA, EPA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers should oversee aquaculture); Englebrecht, supra note 62, at 1206 (proposing Na-
tional Marine and Fisheries Service for this role). 
187 See generally Archer & Jarman, supra note 74, at 253-71 (suggesting that the coastal 
management vacuum be filled by an invigorated public trust doctrine-a set of common 
law principles developed and enforced primarily by each coastal state's court system). 
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But given the probability that change, if it is to happen at all, is 
more likely to happen incrementally,l88 here is a short list of incre-
mental and potentially achievable adjustments that could responsibly 
balance the needs of offshore wind power with other important 
coastal values. 
1. Feasible Recommendations 
Integrate Programs Even Further: The do min an t program, the CZMA, 
offers a highly in tegrative structure. The Act and its regulations ought 
to take advan tage of this. The coastal program should encompass addi-
tional terrestrial values and uses. Ultimately, this approach would per-
mit (or perhaps even require) individual states to account for that por-
tion of wind power's utility not fully valued by the existing coastal 
review process. l89 Movement in this direction could be initiated by fed-
eral policy guidance or relatively minor regulatory adjustrnent. 19o 
Selectively Alter' the Consistency Doctrine. Federal agencies might be 
given the option to preempt the states in certain limited circumstances. 
This approach-dubbed "reverse consistency" -has been suggested as 
a means of exercising a tighter regulatory grip on aquaculture. 191 It is 
not clear, however, whether the scope of reverse consistency could be 
limited in a principled way,192 or if not, how it would win the necessary 
acceptance among state and local officials. Nonetheless, this raises the 
right question: shouldn't expert federal agencies have at their disposal 
more reliable means of ensuring that state activities-which can easily 
halt a project under the weight of permitting-do not directly under-
mine broader environmen tal objectives? 
188 See CICIN-SAIN & KNECHT, supra note 67, at 284 (stating that given existing contra-
dictions and competing interests, "[i] t would be virtually impossible ... to design and im-
plement an 'ideal' multiple-use ocean management system in the United States."). 
189 Although offshore wind generators may earn points for helping to create artificial 
reefs or serving as tourist attractions, the major benefits they provide are not directly water-
related. Given the distinct advantages of offshore siting, however, this does not mean that 
such generation should not constitute a water- or coastally-dependent use. See supra Part I 
and note 127. 
190 See BEA'ILEY ET AL., supra note 60, at 287 (calling for a "national coastal manage-
ment policy" that would adopt a "more integrative framework"). 
191 See Rieser, supra note 85, at 231-34. 
192 One way to do so would be to require a demonstration that significant environ-
mental or other public benefits will be sacrificed unless those benefits are incorporated 
into the decision making process. On the other hand, if this approach cannot be so lim-
ited, it may serve to promote less benign activities, such as the siting of offshore oil plat-
forms or a nuclear power plant on the shore. 
256 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 31:221 
"Apportion" the Ocean IJy Priority. Siting renewables of any scale is 
difficult at best.193 Here, the idea would be to adopt multi-layered 
"zones" in which certain activities are given preference, and others dis-
couraged. This would build on the concept of coastally-dependent uses, 
while offering several advantages along all dimensions-vertical, hori-
zontal, and temporal-including: (1) potentially many more categories; 
(2) development of a common means of comparison or aggregation; 
and (3) further categorical division within the coastal geography. While 
not able to achieve perfect numerical clarity or resolve all hard cases, it 
could provide clear answers in many situations that now lack them. 194 
Although the regulatory change needed to fully accomplish this is be-
yond the present scope, it should avoid a full-scale zoning scheme 
modeled on the terrestrial systems that have been in place for more 
than eighty years. 195 
Enhance Local Options. Conversely, states could create incentives for 
shoreline communities to encourage near-shore wind development. 
This might include a requirement that wind projects share revenue or 
profits with their nearest neighbors.196 Much of the spillover problem 
would remain, however, so a firm state-level presence would be neces-
sary to encourage inter-community coordination and externality (cost 
and benefit) sharing. 
Encourage Coastal Plan Revision. Although the CZMA itself would 
have to be amended to require that states respond specifically to the 
potential for offshore wind development, the Commerce Department 
and its agencies might find ways to induce states to plan for such de-
velopment. The CZMA in the past has been amended to encourage 
such activities as aquaculture, and it is likely that encouragement 
could be offered by regulatory change or by administrative adjust-
193 See Kahn, supra note 109, at 21-22. For renewables, "it is the site that chooses the 
project, not the reverse." Id. at 22. 
194 One should avoid irrational exuberance: the "best" areas from the standpoint of 
project economics and physics may be far from best in the eyes of some of the neighbors. 
That is apparently what has happened to the Cape Wind project off Cape Cod. See supra 
notes 6, 31. 
195 Indeed, that a major objective of terrestrial zoning has been discriminatory exclu-
sion is additional reason for an approach that does not simply copy the land-based model. 
See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part /I-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
346,366-75 (1990). Contra Houck, supra note 179, at 366-67 & n.39. 
196 See RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY PROJECT, OFFSHORE WIND FARM APPROVAL PROC-
ESS, NORTH CAROLINA 3-4, 8, http://www.repp.org/articles/static/1/binaries/REPP _Off-
shore_Wind_Approval.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2004) (discussing submerged land leases 
for projects sited on the sea bed in state waters, which could serve as a model for revenue-
sharing requirements). 
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ment of existing benefit programs. The obstacles here would be: (1) 
mismatch between the historical lack of federal commitmen t to 
significant wind energy development and an effective level of incen-
tive; and (2) a history of approving coastal zone management plans 
that are overly general. 
Embark on a Policy Experiment. Oregon is the poster child of land use 
planning,l97 and the Oregon coastal program is integral to that state's 
planning tableau. It is considered by some to be one of the best pro-
grams in the nation.198 Advance planning is expressly required by the 
Oregon program, and pilot projects are permitted where the effects of 
large changes are uncertain.l99 A coastal state, with or without federal 
support, might structure wind energy planning around a suitable pilot 
program. Given the need to demonstrate feasibility and impact at a 
commercial scale, the pilot might be substantial. Nonetheless, it would 
be the type of state-level experiment that would "serve as a laboratory" 
for more general program design and coastal policy. The data gener-
ated could be studied concurrently with commercial operation. One of 
the current proposals might even be selected to serve as such a pilot.200 
2. Less Promising Recommendations 
Public Tmst Doctrine. This state-based doctrine, often fashioned by 
judges, suffers from many of the same ills that beset coastal policy. 
Moreover, extensive court involvemen t in day-to-day resource man-
agement can be unwieldy and time-consuming. Because of the institu-
tionallimitations of the courts-particularly state courts-public trust 
adjudication is likely to be inexpert and ad hoc. The better question is 
197 See Rusty Russell, Equity in Eden: Can Environmental Pmtection and Affordabl£ Housing 
Comfortably Cohabit in Sltbltrbia~, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 437, 476 (2003). 
198 Vestal, supra note 37, at 74,76. 
199 [d. at 75-76; see OR. DEP'T OF LAND CONSERVATION & DEV., STATEWIDE PLANNING 
GOALS AND GUIDELINES, GOAL 19: OCEAN RESOURCES 3-4 (Dec. 1 2000), http://www.lcd. 
state.or.us/goalpdfs/goa1l9.pdf (last visited Jan. 12,2004); cf. OR. POLICY ADVISORY COUN-
CIL, STATE OF OREGON TERRnORIAL SEA PLAN, PART Two: MAKING RESOURCE USE DECI-
SIONS, A.2.e(2) (a)i, A.2.e(2)(a)vii (permitting limited pilot projects if solely to provide 
needed information), http://www.lcd.state.or.us/coastloffshore/otsp_2-a.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2004). 
200 A commercial-scale "pilot"-from which much about the physics, environmental 
stewardship, economics, and regulatory design could be learned-would be an example of 
"adaptive management." See Karkkainen, supra note 138, at 939 & n.148 ("[Aldaptive man-
agement" is an "approach that seeks to respond to changing conditions or subsequently 
acquired knowledge."). Here, such an approach would in effect create one or a limited 
number of vanguard projects, with the goal being to design (or at least refine) the regula-
tory program around their actual, rather than forecast, operation. See id. 
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whether state public trust principles inhibit offshore wind in ways that 
courts-and in some states, legislators-could hardly have in-
tended.201 If so, those principles may need to be reconsidered. 
Major Legislative or Programmatic Changes. Proposed solutions that 
rely on large-scale amendment of the CZMA202 may not be desirable. 
Those that assume major federal initiatives to jump-start the produc-
tion of wind energy and other renewables are unlikely to occur. Given 
that a number of offshore proposals are now under discussion, or sev-
eral steps toward realization, solutions that can be implemented in 
the near term are the ones that deserve priority. 
3. Other Questions 
Larger issues remain. A major one is how we think about the envi-
ronment, especially our physical landscape.203 The notion of untamed 
wilderness lives deep in the American consciousness.204 Whether the 
time is ripe to accommodate a more domestic vision, one that is less 
dichotomized, is an open question. Yet wind power and other soft en-
ergy paths will quickly become dead ends if we are not able to coun te-
nance human action amid our "natural" backdrop.205 Indeed, if the 
human and the wild cannot be joined in a middle landscape, we may 
never resolve some of the most pressing environmental problems. Al-
beit flawed, the deep structure of the coastal zone managemen t pro-
gram seems designed to advance this inlportant task. 
201 See supra note 127 (discussion of MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 91, which embodies the 
commonwealth's public trust doctrine). 
202 See BEA'ILEY ET AL., supra note 60, at 298 (unified, top-down approach is "unfeasible 
politically and legally and probably ... undesirable," given that" [e 1 ach jurisdictional level 
has a special interest"). 
203 See generally Jay Wickersham, Sacred Landscapes and Profane Stmctures: How Offthore 
Wind Power Challenges the Environmental Impact Review Process, 31 B.C. ENVU" AFr. L. REV. 
325 (2004). 
204 Doubts on this score might be addressed by a brief review of current televised 
automobile advertising. 
205 The contemporary challenge may no longer be how to protect an environment in 
crisis, but "[hlow to integrate nature and humanity .... [Tlo solve that problem, we must 
address what nature means in a world dominated by human impacts .... " Holly Doremus, 
The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discoul'Se, 57 WASIl. & LEE L. REV. 
II, 15 (2000). "[Tlhe rhetoric of nature protection must include people in the picture. It 
cannot simply rely on the wilderness vision of nature ... isolated from humanity .... " Id. 
at 66. With regard to offshore wind energy, much room for adaptation remains. See, e.g., 
Proposal for Incorporating Biological Significance into Wind Energy Macrositing Deci-
sions, Memorandum from Judy K. Dunscomb, The Nature Conservancy, to attendees of 
Virginia Wind Energy Collaborative/Environmental Group Meeting (June 11, 2003) (on 
file with author). 
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CONCLUSION 
The state territorial sea and its coastal zone represent an important 
but untapped renewable energy resource. Wind power is the technology 
best positioned to take advantage of what this narrow but accessible 
band offers. Mter sixty years, we can draw on some hard lessons.206 Off-
shore wind power is poised to test our federalism-to test whether a dis-
persed government presence can sufficiently protect a precariously 
connected environment. But without far greater commitment to coor-
dinated regulatory oversight at all levels of government, any significance 
may go the way of the lone turbine atop Grandpa's Knob.207 
206 They include instructive counter-examples. See, e.g., NILS BOLGEN, MASS. RENEW-
ABLE ENERGY TRUST, NEW ENGLAND WIND PROJECTS THAT DID NOT GET PERMITTED OR 
BUILT (Oct. 24, 2001), http://www.nationalwind.org/events/newengland/presentations/ 
bolgen.pdf (last visited Jan. 12,2004). 
207 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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APPENDIX A 
State Action to Address Offshore Wind Power on the Eastern Seaboard 
State Status Lead Agency Comments 
Delaware !No activity !N/A Winergy has proposed a project 
in federal waters off-coast and 
preliminary discussions have 
taken place with the company. 
Florida No activity IN/A 
Georllia No activity IN/A 
Maine No activity IN/A 
Maryland No activity IN/A At this stage, some background 
discussions are taking place, 
prompted by a Winergy 
proposal in federal waters off-
oast, and in Virllinia. 
Massachusetts Ocean !Massachusetts Task force mandate is broad and 
Management pffice of Coastal is examining all ocean policies 
TaskForce izone Management and legal mechanisms, but wind 
onvened by power has figured informally in 
Secretary of the process. A final report, inclu-
Executive Office ding principles and recommen-
of Environmental dations was expected in late Feb. 
Affairs in June 2004. Several wind power pro-
2003 posals - including a 420-MW 
plan in federal waters - have 
been submitted for regulatory 
eview. 
New Hampshire No activity IN/A 
New Jersey nternal review; lNew Jersey Coastal Preliminary staff work to develop 
easibility study ~anagement a policy, including research 
pffice about environmental impacts, is 
ongoing. State Board of Public 
Utilities has awarded a $300,000 
grant for general feasibility study 
of wind in coastal zone. Winergy 
has proposed three projects in 
ederal waters off New Jersey 
oast. 
New York nformal !New York Coastal Ongoing informal discussions 
discussion [Management with potential developers, inclu-
!program ding Long Island utility, which is 
onsidering a proposal for a 100 
MW+ offshore wind facility. 
Also, there are six other project 
proposals in state and federal 
waters off southern and eastern 
Long Island. 
North Carolina nternal ~tate Energy N. Carolina is actively reviewing 
assessment, pffice, with state urrent regulations and wind 
public opinion iDivision of Coastal esources, surveying public atti-
~urvey_ of coastal ~anagement tudes about wind power in 20 
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State Action to Address Offshore Wind Power on the Eastern Seaboard 
State Status Lead Agency Comments 
ounties coastal counties, and examining 
~reas in which wind resources 
~nd necessary development 
infrastructure coincide, The 
State has received U.S. Dep't of 
IEnergy funding for wind 
~ssessment, the costal 
stakeholder process, and models 
or apportioning local economic 
Ibenefits of offshore wind. The 
~tate's green power program has 
attracted proposals to develop 
costal wind resources. 
Rhode Island No activity N/A 
South Carolina No activity N/A S. Carolina's energy office is 
investigating funding oppor-
tunities to develop statewide 
~'ind resource data. 
Virginia No activity N/A Multi-stakeholder Virginia Wind 
Energy Collaborative is active, 
and Winergy has proposed a 
IProiect off-coast. 
SOIIree&: Connecticut: Telephone Inteniew with Charlie Moret, Managing Director, Investments, 
Connecticut Innovations (Feb. 6,2004); Delaware: E-mail from Susan Love, Resource Planner, 
Delaware Division of Soil and Water Consen'ation, Costal Resources Programs, to Rusty Russell (Jan. 
27,2004,12:18:23 EST) (on file \lith author); Florida: E-mail from Debby Tucker, Environmental 
Manager, Florida Department of Emironmental Protection, Costal Management Program, to Rusty 
Russell (Jan. 28, 2004, 10:08:46 EST) (on file with author); Georgia: E-mail from Julia Miller, Georgia 
Environmental Facilities Authority, to Rusty Russell (Jan. 28, 2004 11 :20:09 EST) (on file with author); 
Maine: Telephone Interview with Todd Burrowes, Policy Development Specialist, Maine State 
Planning Office (Feb. 6, 2004); Maryland: E-mail from Dr.John Sherwell, Maryland Department of 
Natural Resources, Power Plant Assessment Program, to Rusty Russell (Jan. 26, 2004, 09:46:49 EST) 
(on file with author); Massachusetts: Telephone Inteniew with Jane W. Mead, Senior Project Review 
Coordinator, Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone Management (Aug. 4,2003); MASS. OFFICE OF 
COSTAL ZONE MGMT., MASSACHUSETTS OCEAN MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE, at http://www.state.ma.us/ 
zm/oceanrngtinitiative.htm (last ,isited Feb. 19, 2004); New Hampshire: Telephone Inteniew with 
Brian Mazerski, Principle Planner, New Hampshire Coastal Program (Jan. 30,2004); New Jersey: E-
mail from Kevin Hassell, Coastal Management Office, to Rusty Russell (Feb. 2, 2004, 10:00:00 EST) 
(on file with author); New York: E-mail from Steven C. Resler, Supenisor, Policy and Analysis, New 
~ork Coastal Management Program, New York Department of State, to Rusty Russell (Jan. 28, 2004, 
14:36:38 EST) (on file with author); E-mail from Jeffrey M. Freedman to Rusty Russell (Aug. 12, 2003, 
14:15:05 EST) (on file with author); North Carolina: E-mail from Bob Leker, Renewable Program 
Manager, North Carolina Energy Office, to Rusty Russell (Jan. 28, 2004, 9:36:55 EST) (on file with 
author); Rhode Island: Telephone Inteniewwith Erich Stephens, Executive Director, People's Power & 
Light (Jan. 29, 2004); South Carolina: Telephone Inteniewwith Kate Billing Manager of Planning and 
Project Development, South Carolina Energy Office (Jan. 29, 2004); Virginia: E-mail from Ellie Irons, 
Federal Consistency Coordinator, Virginia Department of Emironmental Quality, to Rusty Russell (Jan. 
29,2004,009:17:13 EST) (on file with author). 

